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Introduction 
 
Islam and the Muslim Diaspora has recently been a subject of study in various 
institutions across Europe and North America. These institutions include the 
University of Edinburgh, Centre for European and Eurasian Studies, University of 
Warwick, Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK, Cardiff, University of Leiden, 
Centre for Diaspora and Transnational Studies, University of Toronto, to name a few. 
However, these studies are mainly biased towards sociological studies of the Muslim 
Diaspora. There does not seem to be focus on their legal tradition particularly their 
personal laws. This manual is an attempt to fill in the gap. 
 
The manual has been developed with the aim of supporting teachers interested in 
Islamic law in general and in particular in the context of a non-Muslim jurisdiction 
like the UK. It is meant to be an indicative work book for the teaching of Islamic law 
in the Muslim Diaspora using the UK as case study. The manual is not meant to be 
watertight but rather flexible regard being had to the time and resources available. The 
course may be offered at undergraduate and/or postgraduate level mutatis mutandis. It 
is an enrichment of existing working materials developed by various institutions 
interested in the wider field of the Muslim Diaspora.  
 
The materials herein provided could fit into a half module to be run in a ten-hour 
lecture sessions in a term. It is projected that a 2-hour weekly lecture session plus 1 
hour seminar session every week would be sufficient to cover the outline proposed 
herein. The seminars will take the form of group work assisted by a tutor to address 
issues arising from the lectures at a deeper level. It is expected that students would 
have their reading materials in advance in order to have more participatory seminars. 
We suggest that for undergraduates, the course be assessed through an end of term 
essay of 2500 words plus a 2-hour end of course examination. For postgraduates, the 
essay should be longer with or without end of course examination. The essay could 
either be theoretical or empirical. 
 
A course on Islamic law and the Muslim Diaspora is important for a number of 
reasons. The presence of large Muslim communities in the Western world is now a 
fact beyond doubt. Their migration and subsequent settlement in this part of the world 
raises many issues of concern to both sides. These issues include multiple identities, 
citizenship, the relationship between the host and migrant communities, legal 
pluralism, cultural continuities and sometimes conflict of laws. The purpose of the 
course is to introduce students to these and other emerging issues in the context of the 
UK. It is expected that students would be able to identify and analyse the various 
factors involved in the tension between the need of the Muslim Diaspora to adapt to 
their new country and their wish to maintain cultural continuity. 
  
One of the main questions therefore that this manual aims to highlight and generate 
discussion on, is the impact of the Muslim diasporic phenomenon on legal systems in 
the host countries such as the UK. Likewise, what is the extent of engagement of the 
host legal system with the religious law of the Muslim diasporic communities and 
conversely, how these communities relate (as Muslims), to the laws and legal system 
of their new countries.   
 2
Course Outline 
 
As indicated above, we do not wish to be prescriptive in our approach regarding 
structure, content and delivery of this module. Tutors will find a number of themes to 
include in a module of this nature and reflecting their own research and teaching 
interests as well as themes that are topical. The following is a module outline we 
propose for the present manual: 
 
1. Exploring Diaspora 
 Conceptualising Diaspora 
 Theories of Diaspora 
 Muslim Diaspora and Multiple Identities:  
 History of Islam and Muslim migration to the UK 
Muslim Diaspora and the Host Community: Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Sulh 
 Controversy and the Question of Citizenship 
 Diversity in Unity: Cultural, Ethnic, National, Sectarian and Intergenerational 
 Differences. 
 
2. Personal Status Law among the Muslim Diaspora 
 Contextualising Islamic Law  
 Relevance/Irrelevance of Madhhabs: Emergence of Hybridity 
 Some Aspects of Muslim Personal Law 
        Marriage 
  Divorce 
  Property 
  Child Care  
 
3. Engagement of English Law with Islamic Law 
 Cases decided by the English Courts 
   
4. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 Introduction  
 Concept of Dispute Resolution in Islam  
 Qur’anic Values of Dispute Resolution  
  1. Peace  
  2. Compromised Settlement  
  3. Family Mediation  
  4. Arbitration  
  5. Expert Determination  
  6. Ombudsman  
 Muslims Dispute Resolution in Britain 
 
5. Debating the Introduction and Recognition of Islamic Law in the UK 
                       Cultural Relativism Vs Cultural Absolutism  
                       Human Rights Arguments: Gender Question 
                       Absence of Monolithic Islamic Law 
 
6. Use of Fatwas Among Modern Day Muslims
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                                                         Chapter One 
Exploring Diaspora 
 
This opening chapter has been arranged with a view to providing tutors with some 
ideas on the themes that may usefully be included in a module on Islamic Law and the 
Muslim Diaspora. 
 
Etymologically, two words ‘speiro’ (to sow or scatter) and ‘dia’ (over) form the term 
‘diaspora.’1 Diaspora is a Greek loanword which is the equivalent of ‘dispersion’ or 
‘scattering of seeds’. In the ancient time, Greeks were known for their penchant for 
migration to conquer lands for colonising purposes; as such the term diaspora was 
used for those citizens of dominant city- states who migrated on such mission.2        
 
The term is more popularly associated with the Jews particularly in reference to their 
historical movements outside Palestine or present day Israel and Judea when they 
were exiled by the Babylonians and Romans in 607 B.C and 70 CE respectively. The 
term is often used to refer to either the body of the Jewish communities outside 
Palestine or modern Israel or simply their migration outside Israel. The historic link of 
diaspora to the Jews is so significantly personalised that if it is capitalised and used 
without modifier as in ‘the Diaspora’ it is taken to mean Jewish Diaspora.  
 
Over the years the term diaspora has undergone transformation by acquiring a wider 
meaning which transcends the historically known Jewish movement covering 
movement of other ethno-national migrants for whatever purpose from their land of 
origin to a foreign country and taking up residence, provided a linkage between the 
migrants and their countries of origin and other dispersed groups of the country is 
maintained and there is a longing, hope or desire to return in future to the land of 
origin.( Mideast and North Africa Encyclopaedia), and/or build a nation-state of their 
own in the homeland.3  
 
Going by this traditional ‘ethnonational’ construction which is associated with Gabriel 
Sheffer4, diaspora may then be described as a voluntary or forcible migration of large 
group sharing common national or ethnic identity from their land of origin to another 
country and taking up residence for any purpose. It is not a linear movement in the 
sense of migration from a developing to developed nations but could also take the 
reverse as exemplified by the Ancient Greeks above.  
 
It is on record that at one point or another people moved either voluntarily, 
transported or dispersed from their place of origin to an alien place for trading and 
colonising purposes especially from Europe to other places and on the other hand 
people from other continents moved in large numbers to developing world in search 
of labour and yet some were forced into migration as a result of slave trade, war, 
political unrest and political persecution, etc. The migrant groups in most cases 
                                                 
1 See Diaspora in Mideast and N. Africa Encyclopaedia at http://www.answers.com/topic/diaspora  last 
visited 27/03/09 
2 See Diaspora in Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia  at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diaspora last 
visited 27/03/09 
3 Schumann,C (2007) ‘A Muslim ‘Diaspora’ in the United States?’ The Muslim World Vol.97 Jan.2007 
pp.11-32 at p. 13 
4 Ibid, p. 12 
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exhibit strong national or ethnic attachment by their refusal to assimilate the culture of 
their host community. Thus, European Diaspora, Asian Diaspora, African Diaspora, 
Jamaican Diaspora etc are commonplace. One striking feature of the diaspora viewed 
in the classical sense, is the fact that it is a displacement of large group of immigrants 
from a certain region or country technically removed from their original place but in 
practice expresses considerable desire to maintain a cultural and sometimes language 
link with their original place by resisting language change and maintaining the 
religious practice of the land of origin. 
 
Since the 1950’s when the world communities became open and more accessible, the 
world started experiencing huge international migrations. Statistics have shown that 
as at 2005, about 191 million people representing 3% of the world population resided 
outside their lands of origin and 64 millions of them migrated to Europe. 5  This 
mobility is made possible, inter alia, as a result of the relaxation of assimilation 
policies by many states and the imperative of trade and commerce.6 Thus, a more 
embracing construction was necessary to accommodate the emerging diasporas who 
though have affiliation to ethnic or national identity but have other identities like 
religious groups since Gabriel Sheffer’s theory of ethnonational identity did not cover 
them as seems to downplay religious affinity as merely ‘secondary’.7 As according to 
Gabriel Sheffer et al  
 
‘Although religious element may be emphasized in their identity, practically 
and on a daily basis these Diasporas maintain their ehtnonational identity, 
hence they confront problems and dilemmas similar to those faced by less 
religious or more secular Diasporas. The argument is that religion only 
buttresses the affiliation of members in these identities. Furthermore there is 
no doubt that their connections are with their countries of origin rather than 
with an abstract Muslim World or a Muslim Diaspora.’8 
 
Christoph Schumann identifies scholars like Paul Gibroy, Homi Bhabha, and James 
Clifford who thought of conceptualising diaspora as in a less restrictive sense, ‘hybrid, 
procedural and multi-focal character of identities’ as in words of James Clifford 
‘Diaspora discourse articulates [….] forms of community consciousness and solidarity 
that maintain identifications outside the national time/space in order to live inside, 
with a difference.’(Schumann: 13). 
 
The weakness of the ethnonational construction as identified by Christoph Schumann 
lies in the fact that it did not take into account the possibility of ‘changing forms of 
identities and interactions’. The theory over emphasised the migrant groups’ concern 
for their homeland as pre-condition to being classified a diaspora. The hope of a 
migrant community of returning to their home country and establish their own state is 
also pitfall of this construction given that quite a number of migrant communities 
have no such  political goals.(Schumann:13). The lapses of this theory will clearly be 
visible if one takes for instance that modern Israel was established in 1948 but the 
                                                 
5  Global Migration Group (2008) International Migration and Human Rights: Challenges and 
Opportunities on the Threshold of the 60th Anniversary of the United Declaration of Human 
Rights http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/pdf/Int_Migration_Human_Rights.pdf last   visited on 
29/03/09 
6 Schumann, C op cit p 12 
7 Ibid 
8 Quoted in Schumann, C. op cit 
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Jewish community outside the country are more than those inhabiting therein. 
Statistics have shown that as at 2001, 63% of the Jewish population are still in the 
iaspora.9  
s of Muslim 
ommunities were mainly along ethnic, national and sectarian lines.11  
atrina Hurricane from New Orleans to other parts of the United States (Wikipedia).    
anifestations of Diasporas 
commercial and 
conomic reasons. Thus diasporas could result from the following:   
rthern Libya, etc; The British people settling in British colonies of 
sia and Africa.   
 migration: Europeans and Arabs settling in Africa during the Atlantic Slave 
ade,  
 origin because war and starvation to other places looking for 
reener pasture;     
ong the Gentiles as a divine design to 
read monotheism throughout the World.13  
                                                
d
 
It can be said that a less restrictive construction as suggested above affords the 
possibility of accommodating communities with multi-layered identities, like 
religious identities. Thus using coinage like Muslim diaspora is made possible since it 
is an umbrella body under it lives collections of divergent identities ranging from 
personal, sectarian, ethnic, national cultural, etc.10 It is worthy of note that it is only as 
late as 1995 that the possible existence of Muslim diaspora started to feature in the 
writing of European epistemic community. Before then studie
c
 
The term has been further extended to cover not only cases of ‘inter-national’ 
migrations but also ‘intra-national’ migration e.g. movement of survivors of the 
K
 
M
 
Diasporic communities manifest themselves in various forms depending on the 
context one looks at them. Globalization and mobility are some of the enabling factors 
of international migration of people from one country to another. Generally migration 
could occur for variety of reasons such as political, religious, 
e
 
Colonising migration: e.g. Greek tribes travel to Mediterranean and Black Sea basins, 
Southern Italy, No
A
 
Trading
tr
 
Job-related/labour/economic migration: Settlement in the United Kingdom of the East 
Indian Company employees mostly recruited seamen from Yemen, Gujarat, Assam 
and Bengal widely called ‘lascars.’ 12  The migration of skilled professionals from 
mostly Asian and African extraction coming to Western Europe and other developed 
countries for job seeking. The mass migration of Chinese in the 19th Century to 1949 
from their land of
g
 
Religious Migration: dispersion of Jews am
sp
 
9 LeElef, N  World Jewish Population  http://www.simpletoremember.com/vitals/world-jewish-
population.htm last visited 02/04/09 
10 Leweling,T.(2005) Exploring Muslim Diaspora Communities in Europe through a Social Movement 
Lens: Some Initial Thoughts 
11 ibid 
12 Gul Hussain,S  ‘Muslim in Britain’ at  http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.com/muslimbritain.htm   
last visited 29/03/09 
13 See Diaspora in Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia) http://www.answers.com/topic/diaspora  last 
visited 27/03/09 
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Political Migration: Asylum seeking migrants from war ravaged lands like Somalia, 
the Iraqis who fled Baathists dictatorship, Iranians who left Iran with fall of Shah 
during the 1979 revolution, Indians and Pakistanis moving to other countries as a 
result of the politically unrest during the 1947 partition; movement of Jews to USA 
nd Western Europe as a result of the Nazi’s persecution, etc. 
isaster Migration: Hurricane Katrina and Tsunami survivors  
like Guyana 
nd Trinidad and Tobago as they are populated by Africans and Indians.  
eatures of Diaspora 
to be addressed as British Muslims as opposed to say Arabs, 
akistanis, etc.17        
                                                
a
 
D
 
Many forms of diasporic communities were created as consequence of these 
migrations such as the European Diaspora, Chinese Diaspora, Indian Diaspora, 
Pakistani Diaspora, African Diaspora etc. Further blurring the term some historians 
have characterised some countries according to their historical and political influence 
of the communities that formed them as diasporic. Professor Ali Mazrui added the 
following categories: Sovereign African Diaspora, Mega-Diaspora and Dual 
Diaspora.14  He defines the Sovereign African Diaspora as ‘those countries outside 
Africa whose populations are mainly of African descent, and who are currently 
sovereign independent countries, e.g. Haiti, Jamaica Barbados and host of other 
Caribbean states.’ Mega Diaspora as those ethnic groups though not the majority but a 
substantial number as to constitute a very formidable group such as the Black 
Americans and Black Brazilians. While the Dual Diaspora are countries 
a
 
F
 
Some distinctive features of these manifestations are noteworthy which include shared 
national or ethnic identity such that each diaspora is distinguishable from the other by 
the nationality, language, cultural practice as discernible from the way they conduct 
their marriages, dressing, religious rituals like burial and even the nature of food they 
consume. This national or ethnic affiliation is the basis of the group strength and 
solidarity. There is often a clamour to identify with the root as evidenced by their 
continuous contact with their land of origin and their other brothers and sisters who 
similarly moved to other countries. There is also strong resistance to cultural change a 
point capitalised upon by the receiving or host countries as major source of friction 
between them and the migrant communities.15  Religious identity though not featured 
in the classical manifestations; appears to create formidable networks of multiple 
identities with members willing to abandon their ethnicity for religious solidarity.16 
This is observed in relation to the second generation of Muslims in the United 
Kingdom who prefer 
P
 
 
 
 
14 Mazrui, A. A.  (2005) ‘Uhuru Bado Kidogo: Africa’s Condition Of ‘‘Not Yet Uhuru’’; The Balance 
Sheet’ http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs_site/dirton28.htm last visited 29/03/09  
15 Ali, S. S. (2007) “Religious Pluralism, Human Rights And Muslim Citizenship In Europe: Some 
Preliminary Reflections On An Evolving Methodology For Consensus” In Leonon, T. & Goldschmidt, 
J. (Eds.) Religious Pluralism And Human Rights In Europe Antwerp: Intersentia, Pp. 57-79 at p 58. 
16 Leweling, T op cit. 
17 Ibid, See also Hussain, S.G op. cit. 
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History of Muslims in the United Kingdom 
01 when 
ne of entourage of Moroccan ambassador Mulay Ahmad died in the UK.22  
oted that the site of this 
osque was donated by the British government in 1944.27   
 
There is huge Muslim presence in the United Kingdom and is said to be the most 
rapidly increasing population. 18  By the 2001 National census figures there were 
1.6million Muslims in the United Kingdom representing 2.8% of the population.19 
And between 2004 and 2008 the population has increased by more than 500,000 
bringing the figure to about 2.4 million.20 Muslims have established a long standing 
relation with the United Kingdom for several decades. Muslim contact with Britain is 
traceable to many centuries back. It is reported apart from the mention of many places 
in Britain by a renowned Muslim cartographer Abu Ga’far Muhammad b. Musa al-
Khwarizmi (d.850CE) in his book ‘Surat al-Ard’ (The Image of the Earth") finished 
in the year 833 CE, there is evidence to show that Muslims have been in contact with 
Britain since the 17th century mainly for diplomatic, commercial and scholarly 
mission.21 It is on record that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) 
issues of halal meat and Muslim burial started to emerge, particularly in 16
o
 
Muslims were said to be the first to establish coffee shops in mid-17th century and 
Arabic courses equally started to be offered from 1659 at Westminster School.23  
However, as a result of the colonial encounter with Muslim British colonies, in 1842 
about 3000 Muslims seamen popularly known as ‘lascars’ were said to be the early 
Muslim settlers in the United Kingdom. They were said to be staffers of the East India 
Company from Yemen, Gujarat, Assam and Bengal who use to visit the United 
Kingdom occasionally but gradually settled and even married in port towns and cities 
like Cardiff, Liverpool, Glasgow and London.24   By 1860 Muslims from Yemen 
established small prayer halls performing their religious rituals, ranging from the daily 
prayers, nikaah (marriage), aqiqah (animal sacrifice and ceremonies for a newborn 
child) khitan (circumcisions) janazah (funeral prayers) etc.25 In 1889 the first purpose 
built mosque i.e. Shah Jehan Mosque was established in Woking and in 1977,  
Regents mosque was completed in London.26 It is to be n
m
 
Similarly, from 1920s to 1970s there was another influx of Muslims from mostly Asia 
migrated to the UK to complement to labour shortage in many industrial cities like the 
Midlands, London, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Strathclyde, etc. Again following the 
                                                 
18 BBC News  Muslims in Europe: Country Guide http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm last 
ics Online Religious Populations: Christianity is main religion in 
visited 30/03/09 
19 National Statist
Britain http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=954 last visited 30/03/09 
20 Muslim Population ‘rising 10 times faster than rest of the 
society’ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article5621482.ece last visited 30/03/09 
ns/equalities/muslims-in-london.pdf
21 Mayor of London (2006) Muslims in 
London http://www.london.gov.uk/gla/publicatio   last visited 
04/04/09  
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Hussain, S.G  op cit ; see also Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism Muslims in the 
UK http://www.fairuk.org last visited 27/03/09 
25  Ibid; see also Hussain, S.G op cit 
26 Ibid 
27 Hussain, S.G 
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nationalisation policies of Idi Amin of Uganda many Muslims of Asian extraction 
migrated to the UK. Still in this connection, Muslims from the Eastern Europe in the 
1990’s left their homelands of Kosovo and Bosnia as a result of ethnically directed 
persecution and genocide. Somalis were not left behind as they came in large numbers 
as refugees owing to the political instability and war. By the 2001 national census 
figures over ¼ of the Muslim population, i.e. 607,083 (301,477 men and 296,606 
women) are resident in London and fully active in all professional and commercial 
activities ranging from finance and legal se 28rvices, property, academics, media, etc.  
deed, Muslims participate in political affairs and have representation in the UK 
spite their resistance to the host culture the Muslims choose 
 permanently settle here with no hope of returning to their root apparently the 
rder of the day in the Muslim 
countries which happened to be their land of origin. Schumann conclusion suggests 
that this classical categorization is hardly tenable.31 
                                                
In
Parliament and the European Parliament.29  
 
From the overview it seems clear that hundreds of years back Muslims have been 
living in the UK and as observed from their practices in their early contact, they 
exhibited some resistance to the culture of their host community in maintaining their 
religious rituals like funerals, naming ceremonies, marriages, form of worship, food, 
etc. It shows their preparedness to preserve their identity which was threatened as a 
result of disconnectedness from their homelands and the fear of cultural assimilation. 
By maintaining this link with their homeland they seem to be transplanting their 
cultural and religious practices of their homeland something similar to what 
Schumann considers extending the social environment of darul-Islam (the abode of 
Islam) within non-Islamic environment. i.e. the darul-harb (the abode of disbelief ).30  
Interestingly however de
to
presumed darul-Islam.  
 
The overview also shows that notwithstanding the hostility they faced in the UK, they 
are gradually integrated into the United Kingdom system. Then comes the question; 
what is the justification for a Muslim leaving darul-Islam and migrating to darul-
harb?  How relevant is the classification in modern world?  It is interesting to note 
Schumann made a good point while studying the Muslim organisations in the US. He 
contrasted their activities from 1950’s to 1980’s and observed some major shift in that 
in their early years American society was viewed as abode of disbelief  given the 
challenges they were facing of  moral corruption. Therefore the focus was more on 
preserving their Islamic identity but later the focus changed with time and their 
homeland i.e. the presumed abode of Islam came under incessant verbal attacks and 
condemnation since there was not enabling environment for the religion to thrive 
there. Corruption, political persecution was the o
 
28 Mayor of London, op cit. 
29 Ibid 
30 Schumann, C, op cit, p.17 
31 Ibid, p. 19 
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Chapter Two 
 
Personal Status Law among the Muslim Diaspora 
 
After placing the concepts of diaspora and the Muslim diaspora in context, we can 
move to arguably, the most important, sensitive and politically explosive area of the 
Muslim diaspora i.e., personal status law based on the Islamic legal tradition and how 
it impacts on their lives as Muslims residing in a non-Muslim jurisdiction. 
 
This session will be devoted to an examination of the application of personal status 
law (ahwal al-shakhsiyya) among the Muslim diasporic communities in the UK. 
Students will be introduced to the experiences of Muslims in the UK in marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, and child care as aspects which affect their personal lives and 
which are, in a way, the least perturbed by migration. Despite emigrating from their 
various indigenous ‘Islamic’ lands, Muslims in diaspora still religiously stick to these 
practices as understood traditionally. Thus on one hand, it could be argued that they 
are applying Islamic law. On the other hand, in the context of the UK and of course 
any of the Western nations, application of Islamic law is a dream that is yet to come to 
fruition. In fact, as we shall see in a subsequent session, the voices earnestly calling 
for ‘one law for all’ and vehemently resisting any split of the English legal system 
(which the introduction of Islamic law would amount to) are loud and weighty. What 
does it then mean to talk about the application of personal law among the Muslim 
diaspora in the UK? This would, hopefully, be clear when our discussions of Islamic 
law are contextualised. 
 
Contextualising Islamic Law 
 
It is for want of better words that ‘Islamic Law’ is used to describe the legal system 
based on Islam as a religion. It is inadequate to describe the system as such 
particularly when ‘law’ is viewed from the lens of the conventional ‘black-letter’ law. 
This is largely due to the fact that laws in the Islamic sense are traditionally neither 
codified nor follow the strict rule of judicial precedent as understood in the Common 
law sense. Sometimes ‘Islamic Law’ and ‘Shari’ah’ are used interchangeably. 
Shari’ah literally means ‘a path to a watering place’ “provided the source of the water 
is a flowing stream or spring” (Parwez 1960; Doi 1984). Although it is commonly 
accepted as representing the Islamic legal system, Shari’ah is much wider than that. It 
is the over-arching umbrella encompassing the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ governing the life of 
a Muslim either as an individual or in community with fellow Muslims. It also 
extends to his/her relationship with fellow beings who may or may not subscribe to 
any religious or other belief. Thus the Shari’ah strictly includes both legal and non-
legal/ritual aspects of the life of a Muslim individually and communally (An Na’im 
2002). It is for these and other reasons that the phrase ‘Islamic legal tradition’ is 
preferred when referring to Islamic law or Shari’ah qua Islamic legal aspects (Ali 
2000). This manual is concerned with the legal aspects of the Shari’ah i.e. the Islamic 
legal tradition. However, for its purpose, we shall stick to the expression ‘Islamic 
Law’ notwithstanding its inadequacy. 
 
Islamic law as it stands today is derived from many sources. The primary ones are the 
Qur’an and Hadith. The Qur’an is believed by Muslims to be the ipsissima verba of 
God revealed to Prophet Muhammad through angel Gabriel. The revelation took place 
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piecemeal within a period of 23 years divided into Meccan and Medinan periods. The 
legal content in the Qur’an is not much and the bulk of it was revealed in the Medinan 
period (Kusha 2002). Hadith is the report of the sayings, deeds and approvals of the 
Prophet. It has authority from the Qur’an (Qur’an 59: 7). Compilations of the Hadith 
took place long after the death of the Prophet through a scientific process developed 
by scholars at the time. The process principally verified the chain of transmitters 
(isnad) and the substance of the report (matn) in distilling reports accredited to the 
Prophet. In isnad for instance, if transmitter ‘A’ claims to have heard from ‘B’ and it 
is found that ‘B’ died before ‘A’ was born, the report will not be reliable as there is a 
clear break in the chain of transmission. On the other hand, a purported report which 
contradicts an express provision of the Qur’an will be rejected for failing the matn test. 
This process led to the classification of Hadith into mainly two categories – valid 
(sahih) and weak (dha’if) - depending on the degree of its authenticity. The Hadith is 
relevant both in its provision of independent laws as well as in supplementing 
Qur’anic legal provisions (Siddiqui 1993).  
 
Neither the Qur’an nor the Hadith is sufficient as source of Islamic law (Rehman 
1979). Both were finite content-wise in that addition to them was neither permissible 
nor possible after the death of the Prophet. Since any good law ought to “grow with 
the growth of the society” it governs, Islamic law got other sources which ensure its 
dynamism. These include Ijma (consensus of juristic opinion), Qiyas (analogical 
deduction), Istihsan (public interest), Urf (custom), etc. These are termed secondary 
sources (Rahim 1995; Kamali 2003). In the use of the first two in particular, the 
technique of Ijtihad (striving to deduce legal rules) is indispensable. It is often 
classified as a source. It is carried out by qualified jurists and there is a debate as to 
whether or not its gates have been closed. The arguments that the gates have not been, 
and cannot in fact be closed seem to carry more weight (al ‘Alwani 1991; Hallaq in 
Masud et al 1996). Discussions on the sources of Islamic law are relevant to the 
understanding of any field of the law. Students should therefore be introduced to more 
detailed materials. A separate manual on the sources of Islamic law developed in this 
series could serve the purpose.    
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that Islamic law is very wide. This is not surprising 
because it is a law rooted in the religion of Islam. Islam literally means a total 
submission to the will of Allah. It does not admit of half-heartedness. For being a 
religious law, Islamic law is therefore bound to be holistic. There is no field of human 
endeavour that is/should be left unregulated (Rehman 1979; Fyzee 1974; Nasir 1990). 
The law broadly covers both public and private life. It is when it applies in the public 
domain in a state that the state is referred to as an ‘Islamic state’. Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Pakistan are examples of such states. There are countries which are not ‘Islamic’ 
per se, but have a majority Muslim population warranting the application of certain 
aspects of Islamic public law like criminal law. Sudan and Nigeria are typical 
examples. These countries have in common colonial heritage which brought about 
both religious and legal pluralisms thereby inhibiting adoption of religious law 
exclusively. 
 
As indicated in the discussions under the first session, the Muslim diaspora in the UK 
is a minority group. It is being ‘received’ by a host community with a long history of 
established ‘secular’ legal system. Although it is originally Christian, the scientific 
revolution of the 17th century had diminished the impact of religion in its public nay 
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private life. It is therefore unimaginable that the Muslim diaspora would aim for the 
application of Islamic public law at least in the near future. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that there is strong Islamic identity among Muslim diaspora (Leweling 2005) 
and that fundamental Islamic teachings require Muslims wherever they are to strive 
for the establishment of an Islamic social, economic, political and legal order. This is 
believed to be the order for a successful mundane and sublime life (Khadduri in Ali 
2007). The current debate on the introduction of Islamic law in the UK sparked off by 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, does not take the law beyond 
private lives into the public domain. In other words, it is not about Islamic public law. 
It is about the need to recognise some aspects of Muslim personal law within the 
English legal system in a manner similar to the recognition accorded Jewish personal 
law. To be sure, the current debate merely reinvigorates the claim made for the 
recognition of Islamic personal law for the Muslim diaspora in Britain in the 1970s 
(Poulter in Mallat & Connors 1990).  
 
The debate is informed by, and reinforces, the recognition that Islamic personal law 
has always been part of Muslim life not only in Muslim countries but among Muslim 
diasporic communities in the UK and elsewhere. Even on inheritance matters where 
English law applies over immovable property situated in the UK or movable property 
when the owner dies in the UK, the law does not preclude the making of wills in 
accordance with Islamic law (Poulter in Mallat & Connors 1990). Unlike public law, 
Islamic personal law does not necessarily require the state to function. As the name 
suggests, it applies at personal level. The practices covered by it have all along been 
practices among the Muslim diasporic communities. UK laws may provide for these 
practices at a general level but this does not exclude the application of Islamic 
injunctions on them. Thus while the Muslims apply the religio-legal dictates on one 
hand, they also comply with UK secular laws on the other hand. This has made the 
Muslim diaspora subject to dual laws, a situation described as Angrezi Shariat 
(Yilmaz 2004; Pearl & Menski 1998). Of course the state would be a facilitating 
institution in the application of the Islamic laws e.g. by providing for Sharia courts or 
the accommodation of Islamic law matters in the conventional courts. It is the absence 
of arrangements of this nature that led to the establishment of the Sharia Councils and 
more recently the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. And it is these arrangements that the 
calls for the recognition of Islamic law envisage. In short, the discussions on Islamic 
law in this manual as a whole and within this part in particular revolve around Islamic 
personal law. 
 
The Relevance/Irrelevance of Madhhabs 
 
As pointed out above, the primary sources of Islamic law were finite content-wise. 
Yet they are relevant to all ages. Their relevance transcends providing for specific 
issues of law. They also make general provisions based on which particular rules of 
law could be deduced. The secondary sources are therefore dependent upon the 
primary sources for authenticity. Suffice it to say, the workability of the secondary 
sources is dependent upon Muslim jurists at all points in time in the history of Islamic 
law. Law-making involves interpretation of the general principles of the primary 
sources. Since interpretation is a considered opinion of the person making it, it cannot 
be divorced from the circumstances surrounding that person. Time, place and of 
course the orientation of the person would all impact on the interpretation and 
ultimately the outcome of the law-making process. It is this situation that explains the 
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emergence of different schools of thought (known as Madhahib [plural of Madhhab] 
in Arabic) in Islamic jurisprudence in the second century of Islam. There are four 
major Sunni Schools named after their founders as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and 
Hambali. There are also a number of Shi’a schools. The schools have outlived their 
founders as they still exist. Each of these schools has a different way of articulation of 
legal principles and each maintains influence over particular territorial jurisdictions. 
For instance, the Hanafi is the dominant school in Turkey, Afghanistan, Central Asia 
and India; Maliki in West and North Africa; Shafi’i in Egypt, East Africa and South 
East Asia; and Hambali in Syria, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. 
 
It would amount to an understatement to say that the Madhhabs are relevant in the 
formation and application of Islamic law. The details of the law are traceable to them 
because the primary sources were far from being exhaustive legal codes. For instance, 
while the Qur’an and Hadith have both required the payment of mahr in a marriage 
contract, none gave specific amount to be paid. Thus the jurists used analogy on the 
basis of available provisions to make rulings thereon. For instance, Hanafi and Maliki 
jurists developed a minimum mahr considering the minimum value of stolen goods 
which attract amputation of the hand as punishment. Hanafi fixed 10 dirhams and 
Maliki fixed 3 dirhams while Shafi’i and Shi’a Schools fixed no minimum (Pearl & 
Menski 1998: 179-180). Similarly, on whether or not the consent of a guardian is 
required in the marriage of an adult Muslim woman, the schools have varying legal 
rulings there being no specific provision in the primary sources. While Hanafi accepts 
as valid the marriage of an adult woman without the consent of her guardian, Maliki 
and Shafi’i schools dispense with the guardian’s consent only in case of a thayyiba 
(non-virgin woman) (Ali 1996). On inheritance law, though the field is one of the few 
areas covered at length by the Qur’an, the schools still got to form rules thereon on 
certain matters. For instance, the Shi’a school is known for its liberal stand on 
inheritance to women and grandchildren in the absence of their father. In short, the 
relevance of the Madhhabs cannot be overemphasised. 
 
Could it be said, with the same degree of certainty, that the Madhhabs are relevant 
among the Muslim diasporic communities in the UK? As noted above, these 
communities did not originate from a single jurisdiction. Admittedly, a good number 
of them are of Indo-Pakistani-Bangladeshi origin who commonly share the Hanafi 
Madhhab. But there are also Middle Eastern Arabs, African Arabs, other Africans, etc. 
whose original jurisdictions are either Maliki, Shafi’i, Hambali or one of the Shi’a 
schools. In short, the Muslim diaspora in the UK is “neither homogenous nor 
monolithic in [its] composition” (Ali 2007). If you talk about Islamic law in the 
Muslim diaspora in the UK, which version of Islamic law would you be referring to 
considering the influence of the Madhhabs? Would you simply refer to the majority 
Hanafi School ignoring the minority Muslims? Or would you choose among the other 
schools applied by one or more of the minority Muslim groups? Would it be a 
plausible idea to dump all the Madhhabs since there cannot be a common ground for 
all the diasporic communities? How is this last option possible considering the 
centrality of the Madhhabs to the body and even continuity of Islamic law? It will be 
interesting to know for instance how the Sharia Councils and the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunals deal with this complex issue in their ‘adjudicatory’ roles. 
 
The case of the Muslim diaspora in the UK can be described as diversity in unity. The 
Muslims belong to diverse Schools of thought and yet united under the overarching 
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Islamic umbrella. The situation does not only raise issues of concern regarding the 
relevance/irrelevance of the Madhhabs, it may also be a cog in the wheel of the quest 
for implementing some aspects of Islamic law within the English legal system as 
advocated by people like Dr Rowan Williams. Assuming the system is willing to 
accommodate Islamic law, how relevant or irrelevant would the Madhhabs be? These 
issues are of great concern as pointed out by Poulter in the following words: 
 
A … problem with the proposal for the introduction of Muslim family law 
in England is the practical difficulty of working out which system of 
Muslim family law would be applicable. Apart from the fundamental 
division between Sunnis and Shi’is there are a number of different 
‘schools’ of Islamic thought. Furthermore, many countries where Muslim 
law is applied have, during the course of the 20th century, modernised and 
reformed it by means of local statutes or ordinances. Which of these many 
different versions would be administered in England? Would the choice of 
law in each case depend upon the nationalities, domiciles or countries of 
origin of the parties and, if so, what would happen to all those Muslims 
who were born here or who now possess a British passport and an English 
domicile?   
 
It seems there are more questions than answers when it comes to Islamic law in the 
Muslim diaspora in the UK. In this session however, the focus will be introducing 
students to the issues arising in the application of personal law. This of course will be 
the most important aspect for the Muslims being an aspect affecting their personal 
lives. Despite being British citizens who try to comply with the English legal system, 
the experiences of the Muslim diaspora in these personal matters generally reveal that 
they have not jettisoned the religious dictates. Exposing students to these lived 
realities would enhance their understanding of Islamic law in the Muslim diaspora and 
the following are samples obtained from empirical work across the UK. 
 
Some Aspects of Muslim Personal Law 
 
In order to ascertain the place of Islamic law in the lives of British Muslims and the 
specifics of the application of Muslim personal law in their lives, students on the 
Introduction to Islamic Law Module were required to submit an assessment in which 
they conducted case studies. Titled ‘Application of Islamic Law in the Muslim 
Diaspora: Case Studies fro the UK,’ students were asked to locate one British Muslim 
who would be the respondent for their case study. The main objective of the 
assignment was to allow the students to develop an understanding of the principles of 
Islamic law and how these are applied by individual Muslims.  
 
The methodology for the research covered a number of different strands. Firstly, 
students were expected to conduct research into literature on the area including any 
relevant case studies. They were then asked to conduct interviews with their 
respondent and analyse the responses received to the application of Islamic law within 
their lives in a number of key areas. These included the laws of marriage, divorce, 
polygamy, inheritance, custody and guardianship, adoption, dispute resolution and 
their understanding of sources of Islamic laws.  
 
In total, 68 case studies were conducted. The writing team for this teaching manual 
then analysed the findings of the case studies in order to draw out trends that appeared 
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to emanate from the answers provided by the respondents. Those interviewed 
constituted a cross-section of British Muslims of varying ages, ethnic origins and 
Islamic juristic schools of thought. The responses provided a spectrum of opinion and 
practice, which reflected a diverse understanding of Islamic law within the Muslim 
Diasporic communities, varying sets of beliefs within the Islamic law code, and 
differing practices within families.  
 
Three of these case studies have been selected and presented below to draw attention 
to the differing responses received by the students with some analysis of the same.  
 
Case study 1 
A 21 year old female follower of the Hanafi Jurisprudence, who’s family was of 
Pakistani origin but who was born in the UK was the respondent in this case study.  
 
She accepted that the Qur'an, Sunna and Hadith were sources of Islamic law, but she 
opined that the reality of Islam can only be comprehended with some form of 
interpretation through the systems of qiyas, ijma and ijtihad. This reflected her 
support of the idea of using intellectual reasoning in order to develop rules of law and 
Islamic principles. This reflected the respondent’s deeper understanding of Maqasid 
Shari’a, and thus, her view of Islamic laws as more than a stringent set of rules set 
down to be obeyed, but rather, more as guidelines.  
 
The respondent here suggested that many Muslims do not understand the spirit of the 
Qur’an and the message it is trying to deliver. She also suggested that problems with 
interpretation may be explained by the norms of patriarchal imbedded cultures, where 
there is a failure to differentiate between aspects of religion and cultures which are 
male dominated. 
 
On the issue of marriage, the respondent provided an in-depth explanation of her 
understanding. In brief, she believed that the methods for proposing marriages were 
imbedded with cultural traditions in which the family plays a key and often pivotal 
role. She cited the example of her parents who had decided to marry each other prior 
to the families being involved which was fairly exceptional for that time period within 
Pakistani society. She also states that Mahr, which is a key aspect of the marriage 
contract, was not discussed and her mother did not have one. This was due to the 
wealth of her family which appeared to have negated its need, although there is no 
basis for this within Islamic law principles. Thus, this provides an example of when 
Islamic law is put to one side in favour of cultural realities.  
 
The respondent herself goes on to explain that she herself believes that symbolically, 
the Mahr requirement should have been fulfilled, suggesting that her understanding of 
Islamic law on the issue is that it is a non-negotiable right for women. She goes on to 
opine that women are given a lot of rights under Islam, but due to cultural restraints, 
they do not take these rights up or, the writer would suggest, perhaps they are denied 
them culturally altogether. This presents an interesting point on how personal 
circumstances and the norms of their societies affect the access women have to their 
rights under Islamic law.  
 
One conflict for Muslims in Britain is the form of a marriage ceremony. Most Nikah 
ceremonies are not recognised marriage ceremonies in the eyes of the state, thus 
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requiring a separate civil ceremony for the official registration of a marriage. The 
respondent here crucially holds the view that one must obey the law of the land and 
thus, in marriage she believes that Muslims should abide by both religious and civil 
requirements. This duality reflects the fulfilment of her role as a Muslim and a British 
citizen.  
 
On the issue of polygamy, the respondent asserted the need for a very high moral 
standard for this practice to be implemented; reflecting understanding of the specifics 
of the Islamic law position on the issue. She opined that the modern day failing in 
practices of polygamy are related to a failure to follow the 'spirit' of Islam, as intended 
when polygamy was first allowed. The legitimacy of polygamy is also limited in her 
view, and only applies as an exception and not the rule. This reflects a widening 
consensus amongst young Muslims on this issue. Contextually, she felt that in the UK 
polygamy was not needed as women are more independent and were not in need of 
'protecting'. However, perhaps this is a narrow perception, as it presupposes that the 
only reason for polygamy is the need for financial and personal security. A welfare 
state does of course provide these securities.  
 
The respondent did not believe that the UK could 'handle' the regulation of polygamy, 
which is an interesting position. Although there is little elaboration on the point, one 
may suppose this is related to the issue of legal plurality and the lack of recognition 
for alternatives within the UK legal tradition. She also suggests that Muslims do not 
need the UK to recognise polygamy, if the education of Muslims on the issue is 
tackled instead, there would not be a problem. This misses the point about regulating 
polygamy and ensuring that all affected parties have some legal protection within the 
marriages. 
 
On the issue of divorce under Islamic law, she showed competent understanding. She 
suggested that the use of Talaq al-Bida disadvantages women and undermines the 
equality of the relationship. She does not mention the inequality in procedure for 
obtaining divorce through the other accepted methods however. On the issues of 
conflict of Islamic and British laws on divorce, she recognised the difficulties which 
arise when couples who did not obtain civil marriage registrations are getting 
divorced, due to lack of recognition. Under Islamic law, she expressed dissatisfaction 
with the manner in which the khul is treated and the lack of impartiality in Shari’ah 
councils which are presided over by men. This right to divorce being instigated by 
women is looked upon unfavourably in her view. Also, she takes point with the fact 
that women must forego the dower in this case, as she still considers it their right. 
There was unfortunately no discussion about how she thought this issue could be dealt 
with. The respondent’s views reflected well thought out opinions and consideration of 
the realities of living in Britain and being self-regulated by Islamic laws.  
 
On the issue of adoption, the respondent identified the complexities around adoption 
in Islamic law, although she did not think it was prohibited. The main issues surround 
treatment of the adopted child as compared with biological children. She identified 
practical difficulties with separating children when they reach maturity (or puberty) as 
required due to the degrees of the relationship with the adopted siblings, and other 
concerns. This concern reflected a strict understanding of the position of an adopted 
child in a family, and was not impacted on by British culture wherein an adopted child 
is very much expected to be treated as a real sibling of other children in the family. 
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Although these are seen as problematic issues, this does not impede adoption, and she 
still lists it as one of the greatest acts of ‘charity’ or generosity that a person can 
undertake. 
 
Finally, on the issue of dispute resolution, the respondent believes that there is no 
conflict between the UK legal system and Islam on the issue of family matters and 
divorce specifically. Culturally and practically, she would consult her family first in 
the event of a dispute. This is perhaps no different to any British individual who 
would seek counsel from those whom they know and trust. She feels English courts 
do not have the competency to discuss issues of Islamic laws, a view which is perhaps 
supported by some of the case law emanating from British courts where Islamic law is 
under consideration. Interestingly, where issues such as divorce and matrimony 
related problems were concerned, she would consult the British courts but because 
she views these as providing her with more protection. On other issues however, she 
feels the complexity of Islamic law would make the traditional British courts unable 
to deal justly with the issues. Crucially, she believes that one must be a Muslim to 
decide on principles of Islamic laws. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that this respondent had a good level of understanding where 
Islamic laws are concerned but strongly believes that as a Muslim in Britain, one must 
find a position where there is fusion between Islamic laws regulating their lives and 
the laws of the land in which they live, which must be abided by. She appears to find 
it plausible to pick and choose between the two according to the needs of specific 
circumstances.  
 
Case study 2 
 
A 50 year old male practicing Sunni Islam, of Palestinian origin but who was raised in 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
 
On the issue of sources of Islamic law, the respondent stated that he consulted all four 
of the major schools of thoughts when deciding on a matter of religious practice. The 
notion that the doors to Ijtihad were closed was shocking to him and he believed that 
this went against the ‘whole notion of Islam’. The respondent had experience of 
‘mujtahids’ combining their opinions to formulate ijtihad (albeit in Egypt), and he 
elaborated on the credentials that the mujtahids would need to qualify for the role. 
Essentiality, they are required to know 'a foreign language' in order to fulfil the 
criteria for holding this post, reflecting an understanding of the needs that may arise 
from differing cultures. The respondent showed detailed understanding of the sources 
of Islamic law, and his responses were broad and in depth. However, this may not 
reflect the common understanding of the average Muslim within the Diaspora, as he 
spent a large part of his upbringing in Muslim populated countries. 
 
On the issue of marriage, this respondent and the student appear to be confused 
between the concept of an 'arranged marriage' and a 'forced marriage'. An arranged 
marriage requires consent of both parties, but the introductions are usually made by 
the families. A forced marriage denotes no consent by one or both parties. Arranged 
marriages are accepted by Islamic law, but the respondent uses the term 'arranged' to 
denote forced. The process of meeting a prospective spouse was via families for the 
respondent, which reflects a method that remains popular in Britain even now. The 
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respondent said he needed to show that he could offer his potential bride a lifestyle 
akin to what she was used to, or better than that. This, it is suggested, reflects the 
'psychological and environmental protection given to women in Islam.'  
 
Much of the marriage customs and traditions seem to reflect cultural norms. For this 
respondent, the cultural norms of Palestinians were said to be less rigid that Saudi 
Arabian or Asian families. This issue may have some impact on the norms of 
Diasporic communities in Britain, many of whom are British Asians. The respondent 
was also able to distinguish Islamic law requirements where marriage was concerned, 
with Islamic 'Practice', and a large wedding party was thought to be an Islamic 
practice. This means that a marriage is not invalidated by the absence of a large 
wedding party however, the practice of this can be traced back in Islamic history. The 
Mahr is interpreted as a largely symbolic act by this respondent, who negotiated £1 
for his sister. He did not consider it as a form of security as he viewed it as the 
husband’s responsibility to provide security for the wife.  
 
He describes Polygamy as a 'restricted right for the Muslim male' intended to counter 
otherwise illicit relationships. It is seen as the 'exception rather than the rule' and the 
fundamental requirement of treating all wives equally was brought up. This 
respondent did feel that the English legal system should allow Muslim men to legally 
marry more than one wife, as in his opinion this would ‘solve problems’, as long as it 
was practiced within strict Islamic law principles of justice and fairness. However, he 
recognised that it would not be practical or 'straightforward' for the government to 
implement such an allowance. 
 
On the issue of divorce, the respondent suggested that men were given more power in 
divorce as women are by their nature more sensitive and therefore may use divorce 
inappropriately. This is a view that many feminists would take issue with, and on the 
surface, it gives men an advantage which can be abused. However, ultimately, he 
believes that there would be equality due to the ultimate justice from God of those 
who abuse the rights of others. The respondent cites some friends of his who 
approached the English courts for divorce as they believe the process provides an 
'easier' and more 'practical' solution. He cites a female friend with 3 children who 
approached the British courts to ensure she and her children would obtain their rights. 
The respondent feels that Islamic law being applied in the UK (with the lack of 
enforceability) would not provide the same protection to Muslim women as British 
law. However, on the other hand, he believed that the British courts were expensive, 
time-consuming and probably gave rise to more tension between couples; however, 
this is a stereotypical representation.  
 
Crucially, he did not think a British court divorce would amount to an Islamic divorce. 
The respondent himself says he would use the Shari’ah courts for a divorce. He 
wrongly asserts that there are no fees for consulting Shari’ah councils, and views 
them as accessible as there are many across the country. The respondent’s view of the 
Shari’ah councils appears to be idyllic and the student pointed out some realities 
which possibly made him think again. It is perhaps fair to say that British Muslims 
who have had little contact with Shari’ah Councils view them as 'religious' institutions 
and therefore trust them automatically. The respondent's main issue seemed to be the 
lack of understanding of Islamic laws by judges in British courts, and perhaps a lack 
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of cultural awareness is to blame, and if this is tackled, the British courts may be more 
effective for Muslims for whom Muslim personal law is a big issue. 
 
On the issue of inheritance, the respondent stated that he did not have a will (although 
this is an Islamic requirement) but that when he does write one, it would simply ask 
that his assets be divided ‘according to Islamic law’. Again, this shows that the 
respondent has a great deal of faith in the Islamic principles that regulate inheritance, 
but due to the divergence between the schools of thought on how inheritance should 
be calculated, who inherits, and the 1/3 of the estate that can be disposed of by will, 
this perhaps reflects a rather naïve understanding of the principles.  
 
Finally, for dispute resolution, the first port of call would be the family and if that 
failed, he would consult close friends. If these avenues failed to solve the problem, he 
would then go to the Shari’ah Council. 
 
In conclusion, this respondent was clearly knowledgeable about some areas of Islamic 
law, but with others, his view reflected a degree of idealism which may not reflect the 
reality. However, this may be explained by his upbringing in Muslim populated 
countries and his lack of first hand exposure to Shari’ah Councils etc.  
 
Case study 3 
 
The respondent was a middle-aged Caucasian male, who converted to Islam from 
being a Quaker. He is married with 4 children and accedes to the Hanafi school of 
thought. 
 
On sources of Islamic law, he stated that the Qur'an does not call itself a code of law. 
Rather, he believes it provides general guidelines on Islamic laws. He studied all four 
schools of thought before coming to a decision about which to follow, and believes 
that this is necessary in order to follow any one school. He stated that 'the spirit of the 
law outweighs the letter of the law, and if there is ever a conflict, the spirit of the law 
should have priority. This reflects a deeper understanding and appreciation for Islam 
as a religion and its sources as texts.  
 
On the issue of marriage, the respondent described his own experiences with an 
arranged marriage, with others recommending him and his wife to each other. In 
terms of Nikah and civil ceremony, he believes both are needed and recommended. 
However, he also quotes the European Council of Fatwa which said 'state registration 
is enough for a recognised Muslim marriage and this alone amounts to Nikah.' On the 
issue of traditions, he responded that he and his wife wear wedding rings which are 
more of a British/European tradition, but he also bought her bangles which are her 
cultural tradition, but she would be more likely to wear the rings. This reflects a cross 
cultural fusion where the display of marriage is concerned.  
 
The Mahr was not a big issue here, reflecting a move away from its traditional role. 
£100 and £500 in jewellery constituted the Mahr. He stated that 'It really doesn't mean 
that much over here.'  
 
Where polygamy is concerned, he stated that it is referred to in the Qur’an as an 
exception. He believes that there are very few polygamous marriages in the UK, but 
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also states that he thinks it may be ‘better perhaps if polygamy was allowed.’ 
However, he does not substantiate this. Presumably, if polygamy is practiced in its 
strict confines, with the agreement of the first wife, then he assumes that there would 
be no hardship from it for the first wife and it would alleviate suffering if the first 
wife cannot bear children or is ill, as she remains married to her husband but has help 
from the second wife. 
 
On the issue of divorce, he states that Shari’ah courts provide women with ways of 
releasing themselves from marriage, and thus he feels that accusations that Shari’ah 
erodes women’s rights to get a release from marriage are 'bizarre.' For divorce, he 
believes that a civil marriage requires divorce through the courts, which can be 
expedited if there is a Shari’ah divorce. He stated that: 'I believe that Shari’ah law 
enforces the view that if you are permanently living in a country, then you should 
automatically obey the laws of that country.' This reflects his understanding of his 
role as a British citizen.  
 
On the issue of adoption, he states that Muslims do not adopt, they foster instead. 
Adoption, in his view, conceals a child's lineage, which it would be fair to say is the 
main Islamic law objection to the British version of adoption. He believes that the 
behaviour of families around adopted or fostered children depends very much on the 
community and local traditions/customs. 
 
On the issue of inheritance, he explains the huge complexities surrounding it and the 
vastly differing views between Sunni and Shia Muslims. He explains the philosophy 
of men inheriting more than woman, where men are expected to care for the women. 
In Shia societies, he explains that both are given equal shares. He recognises that men 
are not expected to look after the women in a family as much today as they were in 
the past. He believes that most Muslims ignore the laws on inheritance and follow the 
British system. Perhaps this is explained by the differing nature of British society, 
where equality requires the 'same' treatment? It is surprising that the respondent was 
readily accepting a digression from strict Islamic principles here, as they are derived 
from the Qur’an itself.  
 
Finally, for cases of dispute resolution, where divorce is concerned, he states that he 
does not believe it is necessary to get a divorce with the Shari’ah courts if one has 
been obtained through the British courts. However, he believes Shari’ah courts are 
needed in cases of Khul or abandonment. He believes that most British Muslims do 
not acknowledge the British legal system, and perhaps many men fear that they will 
lose money by using the traditional courts. Thus many Muslim men do not register 
their marriages, and the women lose out.  
 
The respondent feels that the 2 systems should be merged so that people cannot 
'escape' either. He says he is very attached to British law, and perhaps this reflects his 
birth in Britain as a 'native' which are reflected in his loyalties to the state. He also 
stated: 'A lot of Muslims don't realise that huge amounts of Shari’ah are accepted in 
this country, and there is no reason why you shouldn't resort to British law.' Where the 
British legal system is concerned, he believes there is a great deal of mistrust as 
Muslims feel victimised and 'guilty until proven innocent'. This, he believes makes 
Muslims feel uneasy. Perhaps this is a reason why Muslims are referring more to the 
Shari’ah courts and less to the British courts. 
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In conclusion, this case study reflects the position and understanding of a person who 
was not born into Islam but decided to adopt the faith of his own choosing. His non-
Muslim upbringing meant that he was more inquisitive about the rules and regulations 
of Islam, however, he confesses his deep respect for British law. He does believe that 
they can be merged and one need not be sacrificed for the other.  
 
 
Seminar Question 
 
The following is a sample seminar question for this session: 
 
To what extent would you say that Islamic personal law is applied among the Muslim 
diaspora in the UK? 
 
Tips 
 
1. Define Islamic personal law distinguishing it from other forms of Islamic law 
 
2. Discuss the diversity of the Muslim diaspora in the UK having regard to the 
relevance of Schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence 
 
 
3. Examine the experiences of selected Muslims in the areas of marriage, divorce, 
inheritance and child care. 
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Chapter Three 
Engagement of English Law with Islamic Law 
 
 
In the past two decades courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom have come across 
some interesting and very complex issues about validity of marriages and divorces 
among Muslim Diaspora in the United Kingdom.  In this context questions relating to 
the recognition of the Muslim forms of divorce, position accorded to arranged 
marriages, enforcement of the dower and other aspects of the Muslim marriage 
contract, marriage registration arrangements, spousal maintenance, the custody and 
care of children, and  inheritance rights of heirs are of major significance. Such 
problems have arisen with regularity in recent years, in the context of Social security, 
Pension law and Immigration law in particular. It can thus be argued that there is a 
phenomenon of legal pluralism emerging where we can see an interplay between  
Muslim Personal law, customary practices and English law.  This session focuses on 
the application of Islamic law by the English courts. 
 
Cases decided by the English courts 
 
Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1968] 2 WLR 1446 
 
Court: Divisional Court 
 
Facts: A man aged 26, a Nigerian Muslim, entered into a potentially polygamous 
marriage in Nigeria with a Nigerian girl aged 13. Both parties were domiciled in 
Nigeria and the marriage was valid according to Nigerian law. Shortly thereafter they 
moved to and cohabited in England. A complaint was preferred before justices sitting 
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as a juvenile court that the girl was in need of care, protection or control in that she 
was not receiving such care and guidance as a good parent might reasonably be 
expected to give and was exposed to moral danger within Section 2 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1963. The justices were of opinion that whether or not the 
marriage was recognised as valid by the court, the girl was exposed to moral danger, 
that a continuance of the association between her and the man notwithstanding the 
marriage would be repugnant to any decent-minded English man or woman, and 
found the complaint proved; accordingly the justices ordered the girl to be committed 
to a local authority as a fit person under Section 62 of the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933. 
 
Issues: (1) Whether they were considered married under English law; (2) Whether the 
girl was exposed to moral danger; (3) Whether sexual intercourse between them was 
illegal. 
 
Held: The appeal was allowed. (1) The marriage was valid and recognised under 
English law. (2) In light of this, and the relationship between them, she was not 
exposed to moral danger. (3) Sexual intercourse between them was not ‘unlawful’ 
within the meaning of Section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, as she was his wife. 
 
 
 
 
Qureshi v Qureshi [1971] 2 WLR 518 
 
Court: High Court 
 
Facts: In 1966, the parties, who were Muslims, were married at an English register 
office. The register office ceremony was followed by a Muslim ceremony, in 
connection with which sadaqa, a type of dower, was arranged for the sum £788. The 
parties continued thereafter to reside in England. On April 27, 1967, the husband, who 
claimed to be domiciled in Pakistan, sent a letter to the wife in compliance with the 
Islamic law of talaq. The divorce was pronounced absolute by the London office of 
the High Commissioner for Pakistan on 1 August 1967. 
 
The wife petitioned the court for a declaration that the marriage still subsisted and for 
maintenance or alternatively, if the marriage had been validly dissolved, that she was 
entitled to dower in the sum of £788. The husband asked for a declaration that the 
divorce by talaq was valid, contending that the claim for maintenance was not 
maintainable in a petition for a declaration and that the court had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon the claim for dower. 
 
Issues: (1) Whether the husband was domiciled in Pakistan at the time of divorce – 
this had implications regarding whether Pakistani law would apply; (2) Whether the 
divorce was effective; (3) Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the claims and 
make the desired judgments. 
 
Held: The factual scenario indicated that the husband was of Pakistani domicile. 
Therefore, the divorce was effective under Pakistani law and there was no English 
rule of law to prevent it from being recognised. The court had jurisdiction, as the 
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parties had been resident in England for some time. The wife was denied her claim for 
maintenance, but granted the £788 dower. The Judge refused to exercise his residual 
discretion in favour of the wife; the talaq divorce was not unconscionable. 
 
 
Hashmi v Hashmi [1972] Fam 36 
 
Court: Leeds Assizes 
 
Facts: The husband, a Pakistani man, married W1, a Muslim, in Pakistan in 1948. In 
1957 whilst his first marriage was subsisting, he went through an English marriage 
ceremony with W2, who subsequently bore him three children. In 1968 W2 petitioned 
for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and adultery. The husband stated that the 
marriage should be declared void – it was polygamous – but that the children should 
be declared legitimate. 
 
Issues: Whether the children were legitimate. 
 
Held: The children would be legitimate whether the marriage was valid or not. If the 
marriage was valid in English law, they would obviously be legitimate. If the 
marriage was invalid in English law, it would remain valid in Pakistani law and 
therefore the children would still be legitimate. 
 
Mr Commissioner Stabb QC: “The only difficulty that arises in this case is whether 
the law of the domicile of the respondent would recognise the ceremony of marriage 
that he went through in this country as being a valid marriage. If that were so, then 
plainly the courts of this country would recognise that marriage also as being a valid 
marriage, notwithstanding its polygamous nature, and would accord...the status of a 
married man to the respondent, and presumably the status of legitimate children to the 
children of that union. There has been placed before me the affidavit of Mr. Ali 
Mohammad Azhar as an expert in the laws of Pakistan, and quite apart from what he 
says as to positive proof of that first marriage by the respondent to Halima Khatoon 
and its proof for the purposes of these proceedings, he goes on to say at paragraph 13 
of that affidavit that the marriage between the respondent and the petitioner would be 
accepted by a court of competent jurisdiction in Pakistan as a valid second marriage 
between the parties, even if the marriage took place without the petitioner having 
known that the respondent was previously and lawfully married to Halima Khatoon 
and that that previous marriage was still subsisting at the time when the respondent 
went through that second ceremony of marriage with the petitioner. If that is the 
position, and if in fact the respondent's domicile remains that of Pakistan, then in my 
view it plainly follows that that second ceremony of marriage, although it may well be 
void for the purposes of the law of this country, as being a marriage which this 
country cannot recognise, nevertheless is recognised as being a valid marriage by the 
law of the respondent's domicile. It seems to me to follow automatically on that, that 
the courts of this country would recognise as being legitimate the children of that 
union, even though this country's courts could not recognise it as being a valid 
marriage for the purposes of dissolution.” 
 
 
Chaudhry v Chaudhry [1976] Fam 148 
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Court: High Court 
 
Facts: In 1959 the parties were married under Islamic law in Pakistan. In 1972 the 
parties, having moved to England but the husband retaining a Pakistani domicile, 
obtained a divorce by pronouncing talaq at the Pakistani Embassy in London. The 
wife subsequently applied under Section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 
1882 for a declaration of her interest in the former matrimonial home. Before the 
registrar it was contended on behalf of the husband that there was no jurisdiction to 
hear the summons because the words "husband and wife" in the Act did not apply to 
parties to a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage. 
 
Issues: The registrar ordered the trial of a preliminary issue as to whether the wife was 
entitled to proceed under the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. 
 
Held: Dunn J: “In my judgment, the parties having been married according to the law 
of their domicile, the English court would regard them as husband and wife for the 
purpose of deciding any application by either of them under Section 17 of the Married 
Women's Property Act 1882. Any other conclusion would, in my judgment, be most 
impractical and an affront to common sense, because one would have the highly 
inconvenient situation that parties to a polygamous marriage could apply for transfers 
and settlement of property under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 but could not 
apply for their rights to be determined or for sale under Section 17 of the Married 
Women's Property Act 1882. 
 
Appeal to the Court of Appeal: Dismissed. 
 
 
Radwan v Radwan (No. 2) [1973] Fam 35 
 
Court: High Court (Family Division) 
 
Facts: In 1951, the parties, an English woman and an Egyptian, entered into a contract 
of polygamous marriage according to Muslim law at the Egyptian Consulate in Paris. 
At that time, the husband had one wife living in Egypt whom he divorced by talaq in 
1952. The matrimonial home was established in Egypt. In 1956 the parties left Egypt 
to live temporarily in England but by 1959 the husband had decided to live 
permanently in England and acquired a domicile of choice in England. In 1970 the 
wife filed a petition of divorce on the ground of cruelty and the husband by his answer 
denied the cruelty and cross-prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground that the 
marriage had irretrievably broken down under section 2 (1) (b) of the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969. 
 
Issues: Whether the marriage was to be recognised in England. 
 
Held: The marriage subsisted. There were problems with the interpretation of French 
law and the necessary domicile of the parties. However the judge considered that as 
Egypt was the intended place of the matrimonial home, and Egyptian law would 
recognise the marriage, English law would recognise the marriage also. 
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Cumming-Bruce J: “[M]y conclusion is that Miss Magson had the capacity to enter 
into a polygamous union by virtue of her prenuptial decision to separate herself from 
the land of her domicile and to make her life with her husband in his country, where 
the Mohammedan law of polygamous marriage was the normal institution of marriage. 
I recognise that this decision may make it necessary for Parliament to consider a 
further amendment to the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971, if it is indeed the policy of 
Parliament to prevent such unions on the part of domiciled Englishmen and women, 
and to require a change of domicile before there is capacity to enter into them. But 
this court is only concerned with the common law rights of Miss Magson, as she was 
in 1951, and with the status, if any, that she acquired as a result of her decision to 
enter into a polygamous union with a domiciled Egyptian. My decision is that by that 
contract she became the wife of the respondent. Nothing in this judgment bears upon 
the capacity of minors, the law of affinity, or the effect of bigamy upon capacity to 
enter into a monogamous union. Having had the benefit of argument, I do not think 
that this branch of the law relating to capacity for marriage is quite as tidy as some 
very learned authors would have me believe, and I must face their displeasure with 
such fortitude as I can command.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Radwan v Radwan (No. 1) [1973] Fam 24 
 
Court: High Court (Family Division) 
 
Facts: Same facts as above, except that the husband tried to obtain a divorce by 
pronouncing talaq at the Consulate General of the United Arab Republic in London. 
 
Issues: Whether the premises of the Consulate General were within or without 
England. 
 
Held: The talaq divorce could not be recognised as it did not take place in judicial or 
other proceedings outside the British Isles; diplomatic premises were part of the 
territory. 
 
 
Quazi v Quazi [1979] 3 All ER 897 
 
Court: House of Lords 
 
Facts: The husband and the wife were both born in India and were married there in 
1963. Both were Pakistani nationals and Muslims. In February 1973 they moved to 
Pakistan. The marriage deteriorated and in March 1973 the husband came to England 
where he bought a house. The wife continued to reside in Pakistan. In June 1974 the 
wife came to England temporarily and lived separately. In July 1974 the husband 
went to Pakistan and pronounced a talaq divorce by formally repeating 'talaq' three 
times. The husband gave notice to a public authority and supplied a copy of the notice 
to the wife. The effect of the talaq was suspended for 90 days to enable the authority 
to constitute an arbitration council for the purpose of bringing about reconciliation 
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between the parties. The husband returned to England and in 1975 presented a petition 
for a declaration, pursuant to the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 
1971, that the marriage was lawfully dissolved by the talaq. The judge granted the 
declaration. He held that the talaq divorce had been obtained by means of 'judicial or 
other proceedings' in Pakistan and was 'effective under the law' of Pakistan and thus 
could be recognised as valid under Section 2(a). The Court of Appeal reversed his 
decision.  
 
Issues: Whether the talaq divorce was obtained by 'other proceedings' within the 
meaning of Section 2(a) of the 1971 Act and was effective under the law of Pakistan. 
The wife contended that the words 'other proceedings' must mean proceedings which, 
by application of the ejusdem generis rule, were quasi judicial. 
 
Held: Decision of the Court of Appeal reversed. The expression 'other proceedings' 
could not be read as referring only to 'other quasi judicial proceedings' by means of 
applying the ejusdem generis rule, because that rule applied to limit the generality of 
the term 'other' only where it was preceded by a list of two or more expressions 
having specific meanings and common characteristics from which a common genus 
could be identified. Accordingly, having regard to the policy of the 1971 Act as a 
whole and the purpose for which it was enacted, the words 'or other proceedings' in 
Section 2(a) included all proceedings for divorce, other than judicial proceedings, 
which were legally effective in the country where they were taken. The talaq divorce 
followed the acts of pronouncing a talaq and giving of notice to the authority and the 
wife, which fell within the description of 'other proceedings' for they were acts 
officially recognised by the law of Pakistan as leading to an effective divorce. It 
followed therefore that the husband was entitled to a declaration. 
 
Lord Diplock: “My Lords, the presumption is that the draftsman of the Recognition 
Act, by his use of the phrase 'obtained by means of judicial or other proceedings in 
any country outside the British Isles', intended to provide for the recognition of all 
divorces to which the Recognition Convention applies, for to fail to do so would be a 
breach of that convention by this country.” 
 
Lord Scarman: “Under the law of Pakistan, therefore, talaq is the institution of 
proceedings officially recognised as leading to divorce and becomes an effective 
divorce only after the completion of the proceedings and the expiry of a period laid 
down by statute. The proceedings in this case were, therefore, officially recognised, 
and led to a divorce legally effective in Pakistan. Further, the trial judge was correct 
in holding that the effective divorce was obtained by means of these proceedings; for 
without them there would have been no effective divorce.” 
 
Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Scarman were of the view that the law should be changed 
to enable a UK resident whose divorce has been recognised here to claim under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
 
Abbassi v Abbassi & Anr [2006] EWCA Civ 355 
 
Court: Court of Appeal 
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Facts: The wife presented a divorce petition, but her husband asserted that their 
marriage had already been dissolved by talak in Pakistan in 1999, which would have 
meant that they had been cohabiting out of wedlock. The wife insisted that the 
documentation was improper. Wood J held that the court in Islamabad should decide 
as to the validity of the talak divorce and gave directions accordingly. 
 
Issues: (1) Whether Wood J had exercised his discretion properly – it was argued that 
he had placed too much emphasis on the availability and convenience of witnesses in 
Pakistan; (2) Whether Wood J had acted properly in having regard to Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 
 
Held: The appeal was dismissed. Wood J had exercised his discretion properly. He 
had a responsibility to adjourn the proceedings to await the outcome of a case in 
another jurisdiction at his own motion, even if that was not initially sought by either 
of the parties. He had a wide discretion and it was perfectly legitimate for him to take 
into account the availability of witnesses in Pakistan. Lord Justice Thorpe: “in family 
proceedings with an international dimension, it is becoming increasingly common to 
have regard to the sensible transfer by the court...it is worth emphasising that there are 
particularly strong relationships between the judges of the family division and the 
judges of the courts of Pakistan”. Further, it was considered that as the Article 6 
argument was for the favour of the wife, that issue was a nonstarter.  
 
 
Ramsamy v Babar [2005] 1 FLR 113 (not particularly relevant) 
 
Court: Court of Appeal 
 
Facts: Before the husband and wife’s divorce was finalised the husband underwent a 
marriage ceremony with a second wife in Pakistan. In respect of the first marriage, the 
husband occupied the wife’s home and the wife occupied the husband’s home. The 
husband’s new wife lived in the property with the husband. The husband very shortly 
moved out and told his first wife to rent it out; the second wife was still living there. 
Upon applying to the court for a possession order, the court refused on the grounds 
that the second wife occupied the property as her matrimonial home. The recorder 
avoided the issue of whether the second marriage was valid under UK law; if it was 
not then the second wife would not be occupying the matrimonial home. The first 
wife appealed. 
 
Issues: Whether the recorder had been right in dismissing the issue of validity. 
 
Held: The recorder should have either looked into validity, or alternatively undertaken 
an investigation under Section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996. Case remitted to the 
recorder. 
 
Sulaiman v Juffali [2002] 1 FLR 479 
 
Court: High Court (Family Division) 
 
Facts: The husband and wife were both Saudi nationals, both were Muslims and they 
were married in Saudi Arabia in accordance with Sharia law in 1980. The husband 
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pronounced a bare talaq in England in 2001 and this was registered with the Sharia 
court in Saudi Arabia shortly thereafter. It was accepted by the expert witnesses that 
the talaq divorce would irrevocably dissolve the marriage in Saudi Arabia. The wife 
petitioned for divorce in the English courts and the husband replied that the talaq 
divorce was effective. 
 
Issues: (1) Whether the court had jurisdiction; (2) Whether the divorce was to be 
recognised. 
 
Held: (1) The Court clearly had jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973; the wife was found to be habitually resident in 
England. (2) The divorce was not to be recognised in England because it had not 
taken place in proceedings outside of the British Isles. 
 
Munby J: “The simple fact in light of all the expert evidence is that this talaq...was 
‘obtained’ in this country, it was not ‘obtained’ in Saudi Arabia. It was obtained in 
this country because, as explained by the experts, the effect of this talaq, pronounced 
by thew husband on 23 June 2001, was, as Dr Al-Sawwaf put it, to dissolve the 
marriage ‘as soon as’ the talaq was pronounced. ‘The validity of this talaq was ‘not 
dependent in any way upon...the participations or authorisation of judicial 
authorities’.” 
 
 
A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6 
 
Court: High Court (Family Division) 
 
Facts: The husband was domiciled in Iraq and the wife in Syria, Saudi Arabia or 
Lebanon until taking English domicile in 1992. They had lived together for 20 years 
and had two children. They went through two marriage ceremonies. The first one was 
in a London flat and was an Islamic service. The wife knew that the husband was 
already married to S and therefore that the marriage was polygamous. Some years 
later the husband’s lawyer advised that the marriage was not valid in English law. 
Therefore the husband divorced the wife in Sharjah, an Islamic country and the 
divorce was revoked (i.e. they were remarried) three days later. Eventually the 
marriage broke down and the husband obtained a divorce in Sharjah. The wife sought 
divorce in England; the husband replied that there was no valid marriage and 
therefore the English court had no jurisdiction. 
 
Issues: Did either of the two marriages constitute an effective marriage? 
 
Held: The first marriage did not fall within Section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 and was therefore not a valid marriage in English law. The second marriage was 
merely a divorce and revocation of divorce, therefore the original invalid marriage 
continued to subsist. However, interestingly, the court found that there was a marriage 
in existence. The wife was entitled to rely on the rule that cohabitation and reputation 
of being man and wife together amounted to strong evidence that a lawful marriage 
had taken place, which only strong evidence that such a marriage had not taken place 
would rebut. The probable polygamous marriage may have taken place in an Islamic 
country without the presence of the wife; she had signed various documents for her 
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husband and had not known what they were. The husband’s Shariah divorce was 
therefore ineffective in England and the court could make the order. 
 
Hughes J: “The rule is well established that the law will wherever possible presume a 
lawful basis for long cohabitation between man and woman in the capacity of 
husband and wife. The rule is conveniently put in Rayden and Jackson's Law and 
Practice in Divorce and Family Matters (Butterworths, 17th ed, 1997) at 4.11 thus: 
'Where a man and woman have cohabited for such a length of time and in such 
circumstances as to have acquired the reputation of being man and wife, a lawful 
marriage between them will be presumed, though there may be no positive evidence 
of any marriage having taken place, particularly where the relevant facts have 
occurred outside the jurisdiction; and this presumption can be rebutted only by strong 
and weighty evidence to the contrary’.” 
 
Seminar Questions 
 
Q1) Critically evaluate the impact of ‘bare talaq’ and ‘limping marriages’ on Muslim 
women in Diasporic communities. 
 
Q2)   “While English law should broadly approach other cultures in a charitable 
spirit of tolerance and, when in doubt, lean in favour of allowing members of minority 
communities to observe their diverse traditions here, there will inevitably be certain 
key areas where minimum standards, derived from shared core values, must of 
necessity be maintained if the cohesiveness and unity of English society is to be 
preserved intact.” Sebastian Poulter32 
 
Discuss in light of the above statement to what extent should English courts 
accommodate Islamic Family law. 
 
Q3) Courts in the United Kingdom have adopted a mixed trend in deciding cases that 
involve application of Islamic law. Discuss this statement with reference to relevant 
case law. 
 
Q4) Can a divorce granted by an English Court considered as valid under the Islamic 
law? 
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Chapter Four 
 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
A new trend about dispute resolution has emerged during last decade and a half to 
react to the failure of various legal systems in providing equal access to justice. The 
key characteristic of this movement is an emphasis on human rights values, social 
justice and interdisciplinary approach to legal system. ‘‘It is the result of a synthesis 
of a number of new disciplines within law and legal practice that have been rapidly 
gaining visibility, acceptance, and popularity in the last decade and a half. These 
disciplines represent a number of emerging, new, or alternative forms of law practice, 
dispute resolution, and criminal justice. The converging main "vectors" of this 
movement are (1) collaborative law, (2) creative problem solving, (3) holistic justice, 
(4) preventive law,' (5) problem solving courts,(6) procedural justice,(7) restorative  
justice, (8) therapeutic jurisprudence, and (9) transformative  mediation.’’33 It has 
been argued that the dispute resolution mechanisms have been developed based on 
culture, religion and local institutions including religious association34. The Islamic 
dispute settlement methods are driven from Qur’anic values and the Sunnah. Islamic 
dispute resolution which shares similar idea of Western alternative dispute 
resolution’s debate has been practiced by Islamic legal tradition and now widely rules 
Muslims disputes within the formal justice system of Muslim countries.  
 
II. Concept of Dispute Resolution in Islam  
 
Islam does recognize adjudication and reconciliation–based dispute resolution 
processes. Adjudication is used as a rule in hudud offences, which refers to offences 
specified in the primary sources of Sharia (Qur’an and Sunnah) and their punishments 
are fixed therein. Also, Islamic legal system has introduced a wide array of 
reconciliation–based dispute resolution mechanisms which in modern terms are called 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The following table illustrates major 
distinctions between court-based and reconciliation-based dispute resolution in Islam: 
 
Court  Based Dispute Resolution  Reconciliation-Based Dispute Resolution 
Adjudication Mediation  
Formal process  Non- formal process  
Fact oriented reasoning Prospective oriented reasoning 
Coercive power of the judge  Non- coercive power of the mediator/ 
arbitrator  
                                                 
33 Daicoff, Susan, The "Comprehensive Law Movement", Dispute Resolution Journal law, [Vol. 6: 1, 
2006] 
34 Merry, S, (1982), ‘The social organization of Mediation in Non- Industrial Societies: Implication for 
informal Community Justice in America’, in R. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. 22,17-
45.New York, Academic Press   
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Judge knowledge-based resolution 
process 
Parties agreement- based resolution process  
Excluding  Compromising  
Need for legal scholarship  No need for legal scholarship  
Binding verdict Non- binding opinion 
 
One of the major distinctions between Islamic court- based and reconciliation- based 
dispute resolution is relating to methodology and process of reasoning. In adjudication 
system, the court refers to Islamic source of law including the Qur'an and Sunna, as 
primary sources of Shari'a, and reasoning by analogy (qiyas in Sunni tradition or 
reason (aqhl) in Shiite theology) and consensus (ijma), as secondary sources of 
Shari’a. The reasoning methodology is called Usul al-fiqh which determines the 
substantive regulations or practical jurisprudence (fiqh). In contrast, in reconciliation- 
based dispute resolution, the mediator/arbitrator might refer to Islamic law in 
particular Qur'an and Sunna to encourage parties to reconcile but the primary source 
for settlement is application of reason (aqhl) over the dispute for parties to 
compromise.  Also, it needs to be cited that the Judge (Qadi), within the Islamic legal 
system balances the ‘rights’ owed to God with the rights of individuals based on 
Islamic law but the mediator/arbitrator balances  the rights of individuals based on 
their own interest and consent.  
 
The Islamic legal tradition comprised practicing of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. During the Ottoman Empire all judges (Qadi) were facilitating sulh 
between parties 35 . In our time, most of Muslim countries are practicing dispute 
settlement mechanisms based on Qur'an and Sunna, as primary sources of Shari'a. In 
Islamic Republic of Iran, as an example of a Muslim- Shi’a country, the legal system 
does acknowledge Islamic reconciliation- based dispute resolution mechanisms 
through disputes settlement councils, arbitration, family mediation and compromised 
settlement36. In Saudi Arabia, as a case of a Muslim- Sunni society, the legal system 
principally most civil cases settle in reconciliation, following Qur’anic verse “sulh is 
best”. [4:128] 
 
III. Qur’anic Values of Dispute Resolution  
 
The faith-based approach to dispute resolution rooted in Qur’an verses promote 
compromised resolution and reconciliation; “you who believe! Be decent for Allah, 
bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people provoke you not to act 
equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to faithfulness, and he careful of (your 
obligation to) Allah; without doubt Allah is Aware of what you do;” [5:8], “Walk on 
the earth in modesty, and when the ignorant address them, they say: Peace.’’[25:63] 
or “These hasten to good things and they are leading in (attaining) them;” [23:61].
  
 
                                                 
35 Walid Iqbal, “Courts, Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses into the Islamic Tradition,” 28 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 1035, 1037-38 (2001).   
36 According to Article 752 of Iranian civil code ‘A settlement of account is possible either in the case 
of the adjustment of an existing dispute, or for avoidance of a possible dispute, or in the case of a 
transaction and the like.’ There is no legal limitation for parties to construct a legally accepted 
settlement unless to have ‘’capacity for the transaction and ‘’an interest in the subject of the settlement 
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One of primary Qur’anic values regarding dispute resolution is forgiveness (Afv) 
which encourages Muslims to take to forgiveness [7:199], and Allah promises those 
who avoid the great sins, and whenever they are angry they forgive a highest reward 
[42:37] Some scholars argue that Qu’ran encourages forgiveness in three different 
ways: first is forgetting a wrong done, second ignoring an offensive act or person, and 
third one refers to Allah’s divine forgiveness. 37   Other Qur’anic core principles 
including Adl (Justice), Solh (negotiated settlement), Musalaha (reconciliation), 
Hakam (arbitration), Hikmah (Wisdom), Ihsan (Beneficence) and Salam(peace) are 
constructing Islamic framework for dispute resolution.38  
 
 In addition, Islamic human rights values can be considered as related source for 
reconciliation-based dispute resolution. Islamic scholar ‘Majid Khadduri’ has 
illustrated the five most important principles of human rights in Islam: 1) dignity and 
brotherhood; 2) equality among members of the community, without distinction on the 
basis of race, colour, or class, 3) respect for the honour, reputation, and family of 
each individual; 4) the right of each individual to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; and5) individual freedom.39 The association of role of individual, honour and 
brotherhood with Islamic dispute resolution should be examined as Islamic dispute 
settlement practices include structuring two individuals consent motivated by honour 
and brotherhood to settle the dispute. Also, there is need to appreciate Islamic style of 
communication, negotiations, mediations, forgiveness, and code of honour (and its 
opposite meaning, shame) in analyzing Islamic dispute resolution. 
 
1. Peace  
 
The Qur’an values peace as a fundamental component of the well-being of human 
beings.40 The Qur’anic term for peaceful settlement of disputes is often silm and its 
derivatives such as salam which means peace, security, and acceptance. The 
alternative Qur’anic word for peace is sulh which will be reviewed in following 
section.  
 
2. Compromised Settlement  
 
The alternative expression, which the Qur’an uses to advocate compromised 
settlement of disputes, is sulh meaning peace and reconciliation.  The Qur'an 
appreciates sulh and says: ‘compromise is better’.41 In Islamic law, Sulh is a self-
governing arrangement and may be effected in exchange for wealth or in exchange for 
                                                 
37 Gopin, Marc Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the 
Middle East, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002. 
38  The principles of Adl, Ihsan and Hikmah also have been referred as core values of Islamic 
peacemaking framework:  ‘Islam yields a set of peace building values that if consistently and 
systematically applied can transcend and govern all types and levels of conflict, values such as justice 
(adl) beneficence (Ihsan) and wisdom (Hikmah) which constitute core principles of peacemaking 
strategies and framework.’ see  Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Framework for Nonviolence and Peace 
building in Islam, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 15, No. 1/2 (2000 - 2001), pp. 217-265  
39 M. Khadduri, (1984), The Islamic Concept of Justice , Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 
236-37  
40 See Hadji Haidar, Hamid , The Qur’anic Idea of Peace , Paper for:  Political Studies Association 56th 
Annual Conference ,  4th-7th April 2006, access at  http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/5190/1/5190.pdf  
41 The Qur’an, chapter 3, verse 128   
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benefits. In accordance with Islamic Law (Shari'a), "the purpose of sulh is to end 
conflict and hostility among believers so that they may conduct their relationships in 
peace and amity....In Islamic law, sulh is a form of contract ('akd), legally binding on 
both the individual and community levels." 42  Like the private sulh between two 
believers, "the purpose of public sulh is to suspend fighting between two parties and 
establish peace, called muwada'a (peace or gentle relationship), for a specific period 
of time." 43 According to Article 752 of Iranian civil code ‘a settlement of account is 
possible either in the case of the adjustment of an existing dispute, or for avoidance of 
a possible dispute, or in the case of a transaction and the like.’ There is no legal 
limitation for parties to construct a legally accepted settlement unless to have 
‘capacity for the transaction’ and ‘an interest in the subject of the settlement’.44 As 
said by Article 754 Sulh or comprised settlement legally is enforceable except that 
which relates to an unlawful matter.  
 
In Pakistan the section 89-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (as amended in 2002) 
includes sulh as one of  alternative dispute resolution methods.  
 
3. Family Mediation  
 
Mediation is a negotiated dispute resolution mechanism in which a neutral intervener 
facilitates disputing parties agree on a jointly dispute settlement.45 On the word of 
Qur’an: “If a couple fears separation, you shall appoint an arbitrator from his family 
and an arbitrator from her family; if they decide to reconcile, GOD will help them get 
together”46 In Shia tradition as well as Sunni (with the exception of Malaki law) the 
arbitrators have no power to decide that a marriage shall be terminated. Their function 
is over once they have made their attempt to reconciliation. The principle of family 
mediation, known as ‘Hakam’ has been instructed within the family law statutes in 
most of Muslim countries.  
 
Iranian Family Protection Act has emphasized on reconciliation based on Shari’a. The 
responsibility of mediator/arbitrator is to settle the family dispute. According to the 
Act, the Family Court is bound to ask divorce parties to appoint a mediator. The 
mediator should primary attempt to reconcile the parties but if parties fail, the 
mediator must submit his/her opinion to the court. This finding will be shared with the 
parties within a specified period which will be put into implementation except parties 
make an objection.  In the case of objection, the court will examine the matter and 
give judgment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 M. Khadduri, "Sulh" in C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte, The 
Encyclopedia of Islam, Volume IX, (Leiden, Holand: Brill, 1997), p.845-846 
43  Ibid. 
44 Article 753 of Iranian Civil Code 
45  See also ‘Mediating Divorce Disputes: Mediator Behaviors, Styles and Roles’, Lois Vanderkool 
and Jessica Pearson, Family Relations, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 1983), pp. 557-566 , National Council on 
Family Relations 
46 The Qur’an, chapter 4, verse 35 
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4. Arbitration  
 
As said by Qur’an: “Allah command you to render back your trusts to those to whom 
they are due; And when ye judge Between man and man, That ye judge with justice: 
verily how excellent is the teaching which he gives you”47 Although there has been 
no exact definition of Tahkìm or arbitration, in the early history of Islam,48 the Treaty 
of Medina of 622 A.D. called for arbitration of any disputes.49 This concept of 
reconciliation also can be found in the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna) 
in reconstruction of the Ka‘ba. There was a dispute over the placing of the Black 
Stone (Hajr al-Aswad) into the building between tribes of the Quraysh who wanted to 
have the honour of placing the stone.  The Prophet asked each of the tribes to 
introduce a representative. He then placed the stone in a sheet of cloth, asking all 
representatives to hold it and raise it together. The Prophet Muhammad had taken 
action as an arbitrator over several disputes. Another incidence reported in Sahih a-
Bukhari is that Prophet Muhammad had conciliated between litigants on dispute of 
debt. He was report to have cut the claim of a creditor in half in order to reach a rapid 
settlement.50  In relation to the Shia tradition, Imam Hassan defines arbitration in 
accordance with the Shi’i School as a voluntary procedure whereby a neutral qualified 
jurist is chosen in a case by opposing parties to settle their dispute according to 
Islamic law. 51  This definition is in line with the Sunni School, which defines 
arbitration as an agreement by the disputants to appoint a qualified person to settle 
their dispute by reference to Islamic law.52  
 
The Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Act, including nine Sections and 
thirty six Articles, has been enacted on 17 September 1997 by the Iranian Parliament 
and affirmed by the Guardian Council on October 1997. In accordance with this Act, 
arbitration ‘‘means the settlement of disputes between litigants out of court by 
mutually agreed natural or legal persons and/or appointed ones.’’53  
 
5. Expert Determination  
 
Fatwa which is issued by a recognized religious authority in Islam can be referred as 
one of the Islamic dispute resolution mechanisms. This is a non-binding mechanism 
which can be compared with expert opinion in the modern term. However, because of 
high respect and high standing of a Mofti in Islamic society, the parties who have 
referred to seek Fatwa over their dispute will comply with the scholarly opinion on a 
matter of Islamic law.  
 
 
                                                 
47 The Qur’an, chapter 4, verse 31 
48 See Abdul Razak Ibrahim. 1991. The Institution of Arbitration 
49 See ABDUL, HAMID EL-AHMAD Arbitration with the Arab Countries 13(2d ed, 1999) Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1991), pp. 114-115 
50 Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 3 by Muhammad Muhsin Khan. 
51 Halili, Hassan, Employment Dispute Resolution Mechanism from the Islamic Perspective, Arab Law 
Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 2, 2006 , pp. 181-207 
52 Ibid. 
53 Article 1.a of the Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Act 
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6. Ombudsman  
 
Muhtasib in earliest Islamic history was a learned jurist who functioned like a public 
inspector, complaint’s receiver and enforcer.  The notion of Muhtasib is driven from 
the duty of promoting good (ma`ruf) and preventing wrongdoing (munkar) in Islamic 
law.  This concept can be compared with community advocates in modern context 
which function to settle dispute in the community level. 
 
IV. Muslims Dispute Resolution in Britain 
 
In 2008, British legal system officially gave power to the shari’a courts to rule on 
Muslim civil cases including divorce, financial disputes and also domestic violence 
cases. Accordingly, the judgments made by a network of the sharia courts, are 
recognized and enforceable within the justice system, through the county courts or 
High Court. In the past, the ruling of shari’a courts depended on voluntary compliance 
among Muslim community and there was not enforcement. Therefore shari’a courts 
could provide ruling only to those Muslims who wanted to abide by an orthodox 
interpretation of their religious jurisprudence54. 
 
The new development has been made under the Arbitration Act 1996 which classified 
the sharia courts as arbitration tribunals. Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi who 
established the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal panels said that: “we realized that under 
the Arbitration Act we can make rulings which can be enforced by county and high 
courts. The act allows disputes to be resolved using alternatives like tribunals. This 
method is called alternative dispute resolution, which for Muslims is what the sharia 
courts are.”55  Although, Jewish Beth Din courts are ruling civil cases under the same 
Act (they were operating under a precursor to the act for more than 100 years), the 
issue of enforcing ruling of the Sharia courts emerged into a major controversy. The 
main concerns stated were about unequal approach to women rights under Islamic law.  
Nevertheless, most of British Muslim’s disputes never come either before the British 
official courts or the sharia courts.56  Researches show that numerous numbers of 
British Muslims’ disputes are resovled by family or community conciliation: ‘senior 
members of the community or religious leaders are sometimes brought in to manage 
these obligations and regulatory procedures but there is also much informality and a 
search for 'righteousness' on a case-by-case basis.’57 The role of informal groups 
such as family members and community groups has been highlighted in settling 
disputes among the ethnic minority groups: ‘Ethnic minorities have understandably 
responded to the lack of appreciation of their customs by closing in on themselves and 
                                                 
54 See Yilmaz, Ihsan (2001) ‘The Question of Incorporation of Muslim Personal Law into the 
 303–304. 
e/article4749183.ece
English Law and Law as Chameleon’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. Volume 21, No. 2 :
55The Sunday Times, September 14, 2008, ULR 
source: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crim , Accessed at April 17 
2009  
56 See Menski, Werner F. [1988] 'English family law and ethnic laws in Britain'. In: N. 1 Kerala Law 
Times, Journal Section. 56-66, at 58 and also  Menski, Werner F. [1993] 'Asians in Britain and the 
question of adaptation to a new legal order: Asian laws in Britain'. In: Milton Israel and Narendra 
Wagle (eds) Ethnicity, identity, migration: The South Asian context. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
238-268, at 253 
57 Richard Jones and Welhengama Gnanpala, Ethnic Minorities in English Law, (Trentham Books, 
2000), p. 103.  
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operating outside the traditional legal system… Over time, this process has resulted 
in the organic development of customs and specific personal laws of ethnic minorities 
in Britain, which may avoid official channels and the official legal 
processes…Though customary arbitration procedures may not fit in with western 
legal system, their decisions are generally honoured and implemented through a mix 
f sanctions and ostracism.’58 
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Chapter Five 
Debating the Introduction and Recognition of Islamic Law in the UK 
 
Introduction 
 
The introduction of ‘Islamic Law’ in the UK gives rise to a quagmire of issues. The 
questions of legal pluralism and cultural pluralism arise and the theoretical 
frameworks in which a separate law for minorities can be integrated or accepted as 
part of the British legal system need to be considered. Perhaps a starting point is to 
consider whether or not there is a need for plurality in law in Britain, or is it more 
favourable to maintain a uniform legal system applicable to all?60  
 
Particular concerns about some rules of Islamic law which are deemed to contradict 
British laws or provide cause for concern, including perceived inequalities in 
treatment of men and women, and perceived unequal rights, also make the issue of 
introduction of Islamic law in Britain complex. The common thread of non-academic 
discourse on the issue surrounds the subject of the Islamic penal code and perceptions 
of repressive treatment of women.  
 
Negative views of Islamic laws were starkly brought to the fore when the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams presented a lecture: ‘Civil and Religious Law in 
England: A Religious Perspective,’ 61  where he discussed the “degree of 
accommodation the law of the land can and should give to minority communities with 
their own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes.” 
 
There was a strong negative response to his lecture within the mainstream British 
media. The reasons for this included: 
 
- A misunderstanding of the term ‘Shariah law’ 
- Preconceived ideas about what Islamic law would entail 
- A lack of knowledge about the existing Islamic laws already regulating the lives of 
Muslims in Britain (Muslim Personal Law) 
 
The issue of Islamic law and its introduction in Britain (for the benefit of Muslims 
who voluntarily wish to conform to it) also brings up human rights issues such as 
freedom of religion and whether this freedom is being contravened by disallowing 
Islamic religious practices. The place of Shariah Councils and Tribunal needs to be 
considered necessarily, as this indicates the level and degree to which Islamic law is 
already being implemented in Britain whether formally or informally. The 
implications of this on legal pluralism link back to considerations of the frameworks 
within which such dispute resolution forums can exist in the UK. The problems posed 
by the absence of a monolithic Islamic law that regulates all followers of the faith also 
needs to be considered in order to assess the viability of actually incorporating Islamic 
law in Britain, and the likely issues which would require resolving in order to make it 
a possibility.  
 
                                                 
60 A general discussion is held by: Yilmaz, I., ‘Law as Cha,eleon: The question of incorporation of 
Muslim Personal Law into the English Law’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, (2001) Vol. 21 No. 2. 
61 Williams, Rowan, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspective’, available 
at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (Last visited 17 April 2009) 
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The hostility towards Islamic law in Britain, however, remains a reality which must 
be borne in mind when considering all of these relevant elements. The launch of the 
‘One Law for All – Campaign Against Shariah Law in Britain’ 62  forms a stark 
reminder of the charges levelled against Islamic law, and this campaign, launched at 
the House of Lords, is intended to oppose the ‘discriminatory, unfair and unjust’ 
nature of Islamic law. On the other hand, there are academics such as Professor Tariq 
Ramadan who states: “In the West the idea of Shariah calls up all the darkest images 
of Islam...It has reached the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to 
refer to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their 
work by the mere mention of the word.”63 Thus, there is recognition that the fear of 
‘Islamic law’ needs tackling.   
 
Legal Pluralism and Cultural Pluralism 
 
Muslims in Britain who choose to adhere to Islamic laws in their personal lives have a 
host of concerns about recognition of these practices within British law. Issues 
relating to religious dress codes and rules which seem to provide for unequal 
treatment of men and women and are rejected by British courts. In addition, the 
British judiciary at its upper echelons seems to fundamentally misunderstand Islamic 
laws and hold a negative view of its principles.64 
 
Considerations of legal pluralism in a domestic or global setting throws up a 
multitude of issues for deliberation. It may be viewed in terms of Niklas Luhman’s 
autopoietic systems theory on the one hand, or perhaps socio-legal theories which 
consider more traditional ‘systems’ of law when considering the impact of global 
rights such as the human right to religious freedom, to which this topic is specifically 
applicable.  
 
One may argue that the need for legal pluralism is directly impacted on by the reality 
of cultural Pluralism in Britain. However, the extent to which this pluralism should be 
translated within the law could be heavily disputed. On the issues of dress, family law 
(marriage, divorce custody and inheritance) and special observances (such as halal 
slaughter), the arguments are more compelling.65 However, where the criminal code 
is concerned, there is little room for challenging the need for a single and uniform 
approach for all.    
 
When looking at Cultural Pluralism, one must necessarily also consider citizenship 
and the obligations it imposes on Muslims within Britain. British law does allow for 
an array of rights for minority groups, which include the slaughter of animals 
according to Judaic and Islamic beliefs,66  the exemption of followers of the Sikh 
religion from wearing motorcycle crash helmets,67 to name but a couple. In addition, 
Poulter68 suggests that the reality of cultural diversity can be dealt with through “legal 
                                                 
62 1 December 2008, Campaign organiser Maryam Namazie. 
63 Ramadan, Tariq, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, (2004) Oxford University Press, at 31.  
64 This was apparent in the EM (Lebanon) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) (2008) UKHL 64 decision.  
65 Poulter, Sebastian, Cultural Pluralism and its Limits: A Legal Perspective (1990), at 5-9.   
66 The Slaughterhouse Act 1979 
67 Motorcycle Crash Helmet (Religious Exemption) Act 1976 
68 Poulter, Supra note 6 at 11. 
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channels of judicial interpretation and statutory enactment.”69  Thus, one assumes, 
there can be reliance on judges and the court system to take account of cultural 
differences when upholding the law. However, the practical variances in 
understanding cultural diversity and responding to it appropriately from court to court, 
and judge to judge, is obviously very wide and thus not a reliable procedure. There 
have already been plenty of examples of stark misunderstandings of Islamic law, as 
stated above.  
 
On the other hand, allowing cultural pluralism to impact deeply on the legal system 
will open up scope for abuse where it is allowed to prevail without restraint or the 
constraint of recognised laws in any country. In Britain in particular, there are specific 
statutory protections for women, children, religious freedoms, etc, all of which, some 
may perceived, are threatened by Islamic law. However, a voluntary code of Muslim 
Personal Law does not, arguably, endanger these laws, as they are voluntarily acceded 
to, and only pertain to matters where individuals are given free choice under the law 
of the land in any event, such as the manner in which one bequeaths his/her property, 
enters into/dissolves a marriage, views an adopted child, etc. However, one the other 
hand, the existence of an alternative system may lead to Muslim communities putting 
social pressure on vulnerable individuals to accede to these systems and thus take 
away their free choice covertly.  
 
A further question to consider is whether cultural pluralism necessarily leads to a 
requirement for legal pluralism. Is it in the long term interests of British society to 
allow for differences in rules of law, or press for a homogonous system that caters for 
all? On the issue of loyalty to a state/jurisdiction, scholars such as Shaheen Sardar Ali 
state that European Muslims who are settled in non-Muslim jurisdictions “owe 
allegiance of loyalty to the jurisdiction they have chosen to make their home.”70 From 
the Islamic law perspective, indeed, Muslim citizens are expected to abide by the law 
of the land in which they live. Thus, there arises some complexity about the 
applicability of Islamic law to the lives of Muslims outside of Muslim jurisdictions. 
However, it is fair to assume that where Muslim personal law is concerned and where 
there is no conflict between it and British law, then it can be applied voluntarily by 
the Muslim citizens.  
 
Shariah Courts and Tribunals; existence and limitations within the British legal 
system 
 
Without going into the specifics of the existence of Shariah Councils and Tribunals 
which exist in the UK (as this is covered in a separate session), the focus here will be 
a short summary of the limitations of this alternative dispute resolution system. The 
idea of Shariah Councils/Tribunals is to provide a dispute resolution forum similar to 
that which have operated historically in Muslim countries. However, their 
shortcomings in Britain are many, including the lack of an overall Muslim ‘leader’ (or 
head of state) who bears responsibility. Thus, these institutes become affected by 
numerous factors such as cultural considerations; a lack of binding procedural 
                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ali, Shaheen S., ‘Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in Europe: Some 
Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus’, in Leonon, T. Et al (Eds) 
Religious Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe, (2007), p57-79, at 70.  
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obligations; a lack of qualified legal representation; and most cannot implement their 
decisions as they do not comply with the Arbitration Act 1996.   
 
There are now, however, some better constituted Arbitration Councils which seek to 
implement Muslim Personal law (such as the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal)71 which 
are constituted according to legitimate legal frameworks within the UK, and which 
abide by the necessary procedural requirements to allow enforcement of decisions 
under the Arbitration Act. This new forum provides Muslims, for the first time, with 
the opportunity to ‘self-determine disputes according to Islamic law’.72  
 
Thus, this is a shift towards integrating Muslim Personal Law into the British legal 
system, albeit as an ‘alternative’ but legitimate, dispute resolution system.    
 
Human Rights issues challenging the adoption of Islamic law in Britain; gender 
issues; individual and group rights 
 
Britain is a multi-cultural society and therefore questions of the applicability, viability 
and suitability of legal pluralism will necessarily arise. The human rights arguments 
for religious freedom can be cited where specific religious practices are concerned, 
such as manner of dress, as well as the group rights which may allow Muslim 
Personal Law to be implemented.  
 
Discussion of human rights within Islamic law will not be discussed here as a separate 
module exists on that very topic.73 Rather, we will consider the rights Muslims are 
entitled to in this jurisdiction. Religious freedoms are guaranteed in the UK by virtue 
of two main conventions as set out below.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 1953 (including Protocols), Article 9: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’  
  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 27: 
‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language.’ 
 
Human rights which provide for religious freedoms do so, on the basis of a form of 
‘group rights’ which are intended to protect minority communities. Laws such as that 
related to non-discrimination are intended to ensure that all citizens are treated equally. 
                                                 
71 www.matribunal.com  
72 Ibid.  
73 An interesting discussion of Human Rights and secularism is presented by: Freeman, Michael, ‘The 
Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory’, in Human Rights Quarterly, (2004) 26, 375-400. 
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But as stated by Samia Bano, “However objective or neutral the apparatus of the law 
may appear, its implementation will always reflect the norms and values of society.”74 
Thus, in a society that is hostile to Islamic laws (regardless of the origins of that 
hostility) may not implement the rights that are afforded to its citizens by the law.  
 
This issue was starkly brought to the fore by the debates surrounding Muslim women 
and dress. The Hijab (head covering), niqab (face covering) and Jilbab (long robe) 
have all been the subject of litigation.  
 
The following cases can be cited which involved Muslim women and dress: Niqab: 
Azmi v Kirkless MBC, was heard by the Employment Tribunal (2006) which found 
that there was no case for religious discrimination, although she was awarded £1000 
damages for victimisation. Azmi then appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
(2007) which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that she was not directly 
discriminated against on the ground of religion or belief. However, crucially, the 
Appeal Tribunal held that although indirect discrimination had occurred, this was 
deemed to be acceptable on the facts of this particular case because it was an 
appropriate way of raising educational standards. Thus, for the first time, it was held 
that an employer could discriminate against an employee where an external 
manifestation of belief (such as a veil) was concerned if ‘lawful justification’ was 
proven. 
 
Hijab: Many cases concerning the Hijab have been heard mainly before the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Hijab issue has been of lesser concern in the UK as there 
has been limited litigation on the issue. Challenges to Hijab bans were brought before 
the national courts of Switzerland, Turkey and Germany and in each of these states, 
the courts decided that the ban adhered to the state constitution. A woman seeking to 
challenge a ban on the Hijab within Europe can do so under the following treaties: the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol to 
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women 1979.  
 
In 2004, the ECHR heard the case of Leyla Sahin v Turkey75 where Sahin, a Turkish 
student challenged the ban on the Hijab. Sahin was a university student who suffered 
discrimination when she continued wearing the Hijab, and was denied entry into 
lectures and exams at her university. The arguments put forward by Sahin included 
that her rights and freedoms enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights were infringed by the ban.  
 
The ECHR ruled in favour of the state of Turkey in its judgement on 29 June 2004. 
The Turkish government had argued that there was a difference between what could 
be termed a religious duty and the notion of freedom of religion, and the two were not 
necessarily synonymous. The apparent different interpretations for the veil across the 
Muslim world were cited to reflect a lack of uniformity in dress derived from the 
same religious doctrine, which they concluded could not be reconciled with the 
secular principle of neutrality within state education. The writer feels compelled to 
                                                 
74 Bano, Samia, ‘‘Muslim and South Asian Women: Customary Law and Citizenship in Britain’, in 
Journal of South Pacific Law, 2000, Vol. 4. 
75 ECHR Application No 44774/98. 
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question this reasoning on the grounds that religious principles of a universal religion 
such as Islam will by their very nature draw differing interpretations according to 
cultural norms in different parts of the world. This fluidity is a defining characteristic 
of some principles of Islamic practice and for it to be cited as the very reason to place 
a curb on that religious practice lacks conviction.  
 
On the issue of the Jilbab, 16 year old school girl Shabina Begum76 fought a legal 
battle from the High Court (lost case), Court of Appeal (won appeal), to the House of 
Lords (Lost). Interestingly, Lord Bingham stated in his decision that “The House is 
not, and could not be, invited to rule on whether Islamic dress, or any feature of 
Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in the schools of this country”. The 
decision reached was on the basis that although a person’s right to hold a particular 
religious belief was absolute (i.e. could not be interfered with), the right to manifest a 
particular religious belief was qualified and could be interfered with if there was a 
justification. In this case, the 5 Law Lords were not unanimous, with 3 holding that 
her rights had not been interfered with and the remaining 2 holding that it had. The 
Lords were all in agreement, crucially, on the point that in this particular case, the 
interference was justifiable.  
 
Thus, on the issue of Islamic law and human rights, there is an acceptance of the 
prevailing nature of religious freedom; however, its implementation in practice has 
proved to give way to other considerations which one could argue are the result of 
cultural norms.  
 
Where there is acceptance, at least theoretically, of the applicability of Muslim 
Personal Law in Britain which does not impact on those who do not follow the 
religion, the Question of human rights for ‘Groups’ emerges. There are different 
classifications of ‘Groups’ and issues would arise regarding the identification of the 
‘group’; questions on whether British citizens who belong to the Muslim ‘Group’ may 
be compelled, against their will, to abide by Islamic laws in Britain if they do not wish 
to; and how a plural system would operate. 
 
Montgomery77 provides a useful categorisation of ‘groups’ and places them in four 
possible classes.  
 
Membership based categorisation where belonging to the group is established and 
followed by the acquisition of rights.  
 
The group rights within a ‘private space’ wherein “a self-contained parallel system of 
rules would operate”78 for an identifiable group. Samia Bano79 refers to the use of the 
Ottoman system of dhimmis which allowed a plural system of implementing family 
law within the Empire. This is the basis upon which Muslims within Britain would 
wish to draw Islamic family law within a private system with voluntarily application. 
This would require identification of the religious group to which this would apply.  
 
                                                 
76 R v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School (2005) 1 All ER 396. 
77 Montgomery, M., ‘Legislating for a multi-faith society: Some problems of special treatment,’ in 
Hepple, B. and Szyszezak, E (Eds) Discrimination: The Limits of Law (1992) 
78 Ibid, at 195.  
79 Bano, supra note 14, at 166.  
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In certain instances, members of the group may have rights which fall outside of 
particular rules of law via dispensation or by refusing entitlement. Samia Bano80  
provides the example here of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which allows 
discrimination against one gender on the grounds of religious doctrine. This issue 
would be of specific application to Islamic laws concerning, for example, procedures 
for divorce.  
 
Provides for special privileges for some identifiable members of the group based on 
their membership of the group. Samia Bano81 cites the example of certain Muslim and 
Jewish individuals being given responsibility for Halal/kosher slaughter of animals. 
Those carrying out the slaughter are the identifiable individuals within the group who 
are given the special privilege. 
 
With all of these categorisations, one must consider the implications of clashes 
between group and individual rights, especially where individuals do not wish to be 
governed by a plural system.  
 
There are also specific aspects of Islamic family laws that have drawn criticism which 
will need to be addressed in order for a plural system to be successful. These issues 
include: inequality in procedure for obtaining divorces for men and women, the lack 
of a right to contract a marriage without the consent of a guardian for an adult women 
(under certain Schools of thought), custody of children upon divorce and the unequal 
distribution of assets within Islamic laws of inheritance.   
 
Instead of addressing these issues specifically, perhaps it would be more prudent to 
consider the issue of reform of Islamic laws and the need for a new or revised 
interpretation to take into account the different social circumstances in which the rules 
are attempting to be applied in the UK. This does not mean, and cannot mean, moving 
away from Islamic principles which have been derived from the Qur’an and strong 
Hadith sources; rather, it means looking at the areas where flexibility may be adopted 
to take care of these concerns. Professor Tariq Ramadan is one scholar who suggests 
there is need for consideration of such reform.82 However, it should be noted that 
there are numerous potential pitfalls in reform, and several previous attempts have 
failed to win over Muslim communities due to a lack of credible alterations to well 
established rules of Islamic law. For example, the Muslim Marriage Contract was 
produced by the Muslim Institute which sought to revise and modernise the standard 
Nikkah contract. However, this document was extensively criticised due to several 
contradictions of the Quran and accepted Hadith.  
 
The absence of a Monolithic Islamic Law 
 
One of the fundamental objections to Islamic law remains the question of ‘which 
version’? British Muslims cover a diverse spectrum of cultural origins, each with its 
own brand of Islamic law; each legitimate in its own right. As Islamic laws have 
historically evolved to allow, even encourage, these differences in the interests of 
maintaining the universalism of the religion; formulating Monolithic Islamic Laws in 
                                                 
80 Ibid at 167.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ramadan, Tariq, ‘In the West: First Attempts at Reform’, in Western Muslims and the Future of 
Islam, (2004) Oxford University Press, p.62 – 101. 
 46
Britain presents many pitfalls. However, some opinions, including Professor Tariq 
Ramadan, suggest that “To reread, reconsider, and “revisit” our understanding of the 
teachings of Islam... appears to be necessary.”83  
 
Perhaps there is now a need for Diasporic communities to form a new identity as 
British Muslims and formulate a new understanding of Islamic laws according to the 
new environment and social realities of modern Britain.  
 
Shaheen Sardar Ali84 suggests that “The host communities have to be aware of the 
multiplicity of interpretations and diversity within Muslim communities and vice 
versa. Often the numerically dominant (Muslim) group attempts to impose their views 
on other Muslim migrant communities.”85  
 
It is clear from the discussion above that the introduction of Islamic Law in Britain is 
a long way off, and many pertinent questions still need to be addressed in order to 
ascertain whether it is necessary, and if so, to facilitate it.  
 
Seminar Questions  
 
What is the difference between Legal Pluralism and Cultural Pluralism, and whether 
they are mutually exclusive or inter-reliant in the context of applying Islamic law in 
Britain? 
 
Do the Shariah Courts and Tribunals already implement Islamic law in Britain? What 
are the limitations? 
 
What are the Human Rights issues which challenge the adoption of Islamic law in 
Britain? 
 
Is there a Monolithic Islamic Law which can be implemented in Britain? 
 
Readings 
 
Poulter, Sebastian, Cultural Pluralism and its Limits: A Legal Perspective (1990) 
Freeman, M, ‘The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 2004, (26)2, 375-400.  
 
Samia Bano, ‘Muslim and South Asian Women: Customary Law and Citizenship in 
Britain’, in Journal of South Pacific Law, 2000, Vol. 4. 
 
Barbeiri, W ‘Group Rights and the Muslim Diaspora’, Human Rights Quarterly 21.4 
(1999) p. 907-926 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v21/21.4 
barbeiri.html 
 
Montgomery, M., ‘Legislating for a multi-faith society: Some problems of special 
treatment,’ in Hepple, B. and Szyszezak, E (Eds) Discrimination: The Limits of Law 
(1992) 
                                                 
83 Ibid, at 69. 
84 Ali, Supra note 11. 
85 Ibid at 59.  
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Future of Islam, (2004) Oxford University Press, p.62 – 101. 
 
Williams, Rowan, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspective’, 
available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 
 
Weller, P (2006) ‘Addressing Religious Discrimination and Islamophobia: Muslims 
and Liberal Democracies. The Case of the United Kingdom’ Journal of Islamic 
Studies 17:3 (2006) pp295-325 
 
Ali, Shaheen S., ‘Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in 
Europe: Some Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus’, 
in Leonon, T. Et al (Eds) Religious Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe, (2007), 
p57-79 
 
Yousif, A., ‘Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern 
Theory of Pluralism’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 2000, Vol. 20, No.1 
 
Yilmaz, Ihsan, ‘Law as Chameleon: The question of incorporation of Muslim 
Personal Law into the English Law’, in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, (2001) 
Vol. 21 No. 2. 
 
Freeman, Michael, ‘The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory’, in Human 
Rights Quarterly, (2004) 26, 375-400. 
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Chapter 6 
The Use of Fatwas Among Modern Day Muslims 
 
Fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling or a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law 
issued by a recognized religious authority in Islam. Those who pronounce these 
rulings are supposed to be knowledgeable, and need to supply the evidence from 
Islamic sources for their opinions. It is not uncommon for scholars to come to 
different conclusions regarding the same issue. But as there is no hierarchical 
priesthood in Islam, a fatwa is not necessarily "binding" on the faithful.  In recent 
years there has been an increasing trend of using the cyber space for issuing fatwas. 
The use of internet technology has brought about a revolutionary change in the 
process of Fatwas. A number of websites and online forums have been developed for 
this purpose and an increasing number of Muslims in particular in Europe, Canada, 
America are using the cyber space to seek advice from religious scholars on socio-
legal and political issues faced by the Muslim diasporic communities. Religious 
scholars belonging to different sects and schools of thought respond to questions 
posed and discuss a wide range of issues. However, even within the same sect, there 
can be fundamental differences in interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and rival 
muftis from the same sect can issue contradictory Fatwas. As a result the credibility of 
such fatwas, is being questioned by scholars and academics as conflicting opinions 
are being issued, based on literal interpretations of the Qur’an.   
 
From Individual to Collective Fatwa? Institution of Ifta As Transformative 
Vehicle in the Islamic Legal Tradition86 
 
One of the most powerful vehicles of interpretative and transformative processes 
within the Islamic legal tradition lies in the role played by the institution of ifta. The 
fatwa or non-binding opinion of a mufti given in response to a question (posed by a 
qadi, a private person or an institution), ‘formed the vital link between academic 
theories of pure scholarship and the influences of practical life, and through them the 
dictates of the doctrine were gradually adapted to the changing needs of Muslim 
society.’ 87  
 
Over 1400 years of Islam’s legal history, public institutionalised application of 
Islamic law has existed side by side with private and autonomous initiatives of legal 
interpretation.  The fatwa is perceived by many as the ‘meeting point between legal 
theory and social practice’88 serving a number of functions ranging from a legal tool 
assisting the adjudication process (employed by a qadi), to fatwas as social 
instruments (in the form of questions by private persons in the community), political 
discourses (seeking a fatwa in relation to an act of state or government either within 
the state or to another state or states), and as devices for reform (where a mufti, in 
response to a question, presents his viewpoint for reform in existing practice). 
 
                                                 
86  These extracts have been taken from Professor Shaheen Sardar Ali’s Key note address on   
‘Systemically closed, cognitively open’*? A Critical Analysis of Transformative Processes in Islamic 
Law and Muslim State Practice’ delivered  at a conference in Copenhagen. 
87 Coulson, 142. 
88 A. Caeiro, “The Shifting Moral Universes of the Islamic Tradition of Ifta: A Diachronic Study of 
Four Adab al-Fatwa Manuals” (2006) 96 The Muslim World at p. 661 
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Although not mutually exclusive, this interpretative exercise falls under binding 
judgements issued from within an institution of the state by judges (qadi), and non-
binding advisory opinions (fatwa; fatawa) by juris consults (mufti) in response to an 
individual question as well as formal requests of opinions by qadis. Hallaq defines a 
Fatwa as: “. . . consists of a question (sua-al, istifta), addressed to a juris consult 
(mufti), together with an answer (jawab) provided by that juris consult.”89 He states 
that there exists strong evidence to indicate that Fatwas went beyond simply 
responses to individual questions and played a considerable role in the growth and 
evolution of Islamic substantive law.90 This is likely to have been the case as fatwas 
issued by leading jurists were often collected and published and used as authoritative 
precedents.91 The history of fatwas is therefore a uniquely placed within the Islamic 
legal tradition as it stands at the crossroads between theory and practice of Islam, the 
formal and non-formal structures of authority and their relational location within 
Muslim communities. It thus provides both ‘text’ (the fatwa) and context (the space 
within which the question is posed and to which it applies) as well as the link between 
the two.  
 
Ali argues that whilst Fatwas contributed to legal discourse within the Islamic legal 
tradition it was also an important social instrument and helped in shaping societal 
views on issues from the mundane to the sublime. This point is significant in the 
transformative processes of the Islamic legal tradition and contrary to assumptions 
that statute laws would eventually marginalise this genre leading to its extinction. In 
particular it is important to bear in mind that in view of the high rates of illiteracy 
among Muslim populations and their dependency on the mass media (radio and 
television), reliance on ‘verbal’ fatwas delivered to an audience has increasingly 
become a popular offering of radio and television channels. It is this aspect of the 
transformation of the fatwa as a response by an individual mufti to an individual 
question that appears to have taken a grip on the institution of ifta in contemporary 
times.  
 
Fatwa represents a bottom-up approach to informing and influencing the formal legal 
system and is representative of the ordinary Muslim’s concern regarding ‘Islamicness’ 
of actions and issues around her/him (legal and non-legal). The qadi pronounces 
binding judgements in response to questions arising from the litigant public and at 
times with assistance of muftis. Fatwas on the other hand have a wider and more 
informal remit in responding to questions that were not necessarily litigational (in the 
legal sense). They could be clarifications of existing circumstances and/or legal rules, 
moral or social, ethical, political and economic questions.  
 
Fatwas have acquired a different legal complexion in diverse Muslim populations and 
jurisdictions and in today’s era of globalisation, the common Muslims’ short cut 
access to ‘Islamic’ knowledge on a range of subjects. In particular, fatwas appear to 
be acquiring increasing popularity as scores of troubled Muslim young and old, lose 
faith in their respective governments and turn towards an ‘Ummatic’ response from 
scholars anywhere in the world so long as they belong to the Muslim Ummah. 
                                                 
89 W. B. Hallaq, “From Fatwa to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law” (1994) 1 
Islamic Law and Society 29 at p. 31. 
90 Ibid 
91 The list of such fatwa collections is too numerous to be included here. For some of the most 
prominent fatwa collections, see Ibid.  
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Summing up this discussion on the structure, evolution and dynamics of the 
institution of ifta, it is fair to state that a number of parallel normative developments 
have emerged. On the one hand, there exists the definitiveness of divine text (the 
Qur’an) and divinely inspired text (Hadith) that remains the foundational basis of the 
structure of the legal edifice. Simultaneously, individual and collective autonomy of 
thought and action through fatwas have contributed to responsiveness within Islamic 
law and jurisprudence. Ali is of the view that there appears to have evolved, an 
invisible hierarchy within the Islamic legal tradition regarding its sources and 
techniques. The top down sources appear to remain incognisant of initiatives from 
below (i.e., through urf or fatwa) despite the fact that both these institutions feed and 
enrich its evolution and make it contemporary. Conversely, Fatwas challenging and 
undermining the prerogative of governments in Muslim jurisdictions appear to have 
created parallel institutions appealing to the Muslims in cities, towns and the rural 
areas over and above the head of governments. These opinions have also brought into 
prominence the ever present fluidity of concepts including as-Siyar and Jihad within 
‘formal’ legal writings on Islamic law, and how these concepts understood and 
internalised by the resistance movements (for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 
Palestine and in Pakistan), as tools for liberation.  
 
In light of the above discussion this seminar aims to explore the validity of fatwas 
issued by using the internet websites and online forums.  
 
Seminar Questions 
 
Q1) Discuss the legal significance of fatwa in developing Islamic jurisprudence?  
 
Q2) Who is authorized to issue Fatwas and is it obligatory on Muslims to follow a 
Fatwa? 
 
Q3)  Should the state extend legitimacy to the issuance of Fatwas? 
 
Q4) Critically evaluate the role and use of Fatwas via cyber space in contributing to 
the development of Islamic Jurisprudence by using the example of two internet 
websites on Fatwas. 
 
Readings: 
 
Masud, M.K. Brinkley, M. and Powers, D. S. (1996) Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftis and Their Fatwas. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Hallaq, W. B. (1996) “Ifta’ and Ijtihad in Sunni Legal Theory: A Developmental 
Account” in M.K.Masud, B. Messck & D. Powers (eds.) Islamic Legal Interpretation. 
Muftis and Their Fatwas Cambridge: Harvard University Press pp. 33-43. 
 
Hallaq, W. B. (1994) “From Fatwas to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic 
Substantive Law” Vol. 1, Islamic Law and Society.   
 
Burhanudin, J. (2005) “Aspiring for Islamic Reform: Southeast Asian Requests for 
Fatw s in al-Man r” Vol.12, No.1, Islamic Law and Society.  
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Calder, N.  (1996) “Al-Nawawi's Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a 
General Theory of Islamic Law: Issues and Problems” Vol.3, Islamic Law and Society.  
 
Caeiro, A. (2006) “The Shifting Moral Universes of the Islamic Tradition of Iftā': A 
Diachronic Study of Four Adab al-Fatwā Manuals” Vol. 96, No. 4, The Muslim 
World. pp. 661–685. 
 
Peters, R. (1994) “Muhammad Al-Abbasi Al-Mahdi (d. 1987), Grand Mufti of Egypt, 
and His Al-Fatawa Al-Mahdiyya” Vol.1, Islamic Law and Society.  
 
Šisler, Vít. Islamic Jurisprudence in Cyberspace: Construction of Interpretative 
Authority in Muslim Diaspora. In: Cyberspace. 2005 conference proceedings, Ed. 
Polčák, R., Škop, M., Šmahel D., Brno: Masaryk University, 2006, p. 43 - 50, ISBN: 
80-210-4060-2. 
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